Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 36, Issue 5

2013

Article 8

How the ECJ Thinks: A Study on Judicial
Legitimacy
Koen Lenaerts∗

∗

Leuven University

Copyright c 2013 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

HOW THE ECJ THINKS: A STUDY ON JUDICIAL
LEGITIMACY
Koen Len aerts
INTRODUCTION
I. EXTERNAL AND INTERNALJUDICIAL LEGITIMACY
II. EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY
A. The ECJ and the EU legislator
1. Reconciliatory Interpretation: An Example
2. Primary ELU Law and the Objectives Pursued by
the EU Legislator
3. Judicial Deference to Legislative Choices
B. The ECJ and the Member States
1. In the Absence of EU Harmonization
i. The Importance of Constitutional Principles
Embedded in National Law
ii. The Importance of Consistency
2. In the Presence of EU harmonization
III. INTERNAL LEGITIMACY
A. The ECJ and National Courts
B. The Persuasiveness of the ECJ's Legal Reasoning
1. The Founding Stone
2. The Three Unsolved Questions After Ruiz
Zambrano
3. The "Stone-by-Stone" Approach
i. McCarhty: Drawing the Distinction Between
the "Impeding Effect" and the "Deprivation
Effect"
ii. Dereci: the Scope of Application of
Fundamental Rights

1303
1305
1310
1310
1310
1313
1323
1326
1327
1327
1331
1338
1342
1342
1350
1353
1354
1356

1356
1359

Vice-President of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Professor of
European Union Law, Leuven University. All opinions expressed herein are strictly
personal to the author.

1302

2013]

A STUDY ONJUDICIAL LEGITIMACY

iii. lida: Purely Hypothetical Impediments to
Free Movement
iv. 0 & S: Exploring the Notion of
Dependency
4. Concluding Remarks
CONCLUSION

1803

1361
1364
1368
1369

INTRODUCTION
Writing extrajudiciallyl Sir Konrad Schiemann-former
Lord Justice of Appeal and Judge at the European Court of
Justice (the "LCJ"-highlighted the differences in the style of
judgment between English courts and the LCJ. First, he noted
that the ECJ operates at a level of abstraction which is strange
for English courts. Unlike the latter, the ECJ interprets both
primary and secondary EU law in a way which is not necessarily
limited to the facts of the case at hand, but "can be used
whenever and in whatever circumstances the relevant provision
is part of the body of law relevant to that case."2 Second, unlike
English judges (including Appeal Court judges who are entitled
to deliver concurring and, as the case may be, dissenting
opinions), the ECJ operates under a strict version of the
principle of collegiality. This means that it only renders
"committee judgments" where "[c] ompromise is the name of
the game." 3 Third, regarding the use of precedence, he
observed that, whilst both English courts and the ECJ have very
often recourse to previous case-law with a view to reinforcing
their determinations, only the latter relies on "the precise
wording of a particular phrase in past judgments."4 Finally, as to
the way in which the oral hearings are held, Schiemann
observed that they play a more important role in England than
they do in Luxembourg, where parties focus on their written
observations. In summary, he opined that both systems have
1. Sir Konrad Schicmann,

From Common Law judge to European judge, 13

ZETTSCHRIFT FOR EUROPATSCHES PRIVATRECHT 741

(2005)

[hereinafter Schiemann,

Common Law Judge].
2. Id. at 742.
3. Sir Konrad Schiemann, Should We come Together?: Reflections on DJerent Styles of
Judicial Reasoning, 9 ZLITSCHRIFT FUR EUROPARECHTLICHL STUDIEN 1, 7 (2006)
[hercinafter Schienmann, Reflections].
4. Schiemanni,

Commnon Lawjqfudge, supra note 1, at 745.
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advantages and disadvantages. For example, the English system
allows everyone to see how each of the judges sitting in the

Appeal Court thinks. However, it is difficult to find "what the law
is" where judges have agreed as to the outcome of the case but
do not follow the same strand of reasoning. As to the ECJ, he
criticized the fact that there is a time lapse, sometimes an
important one, between the oral hearing and the date on which
judicial deliberations are to take place. Such a time lapse is,
however, unavoidable where the Advocate General is asked to
deliver an Opinion. Overall, he enjoyed the English judicial
process more because it allows a style of judgment which is more
"flowery" and, as such, better tailored "to catch the attention of
the casual reader and to reveal that [the judge has] had doubts
as to the best solution and why [he or she has] eventually come
down on one side of the fence." 5 However, as a concluding
remark, he observed that "there is no denving that the style
which the ECJ has evolved is a better one for the particular tasks
which the ECJ has." In this regard, he stated that, "I have the
feeling that there is a genuine attempt to arrive at the best

common solution that the brains of the [ECJ] can reach."7
The purpose of my contribution is thus to honour Sir
Konrad Schiemann, former colleague and friend, by
demonstrating that his "feeling" regarding the way in which the
ECJ thinks is well-founded. To this end, I attempt to explore the
two dimensions of judicial legitimacy as applied to the ECJ.
Stated differently, this contribution seeks to explore the external
and internal legitimacy of the ECJ when the latter interacts with
the EU legislature, the Member States, and national courts.
Based on the study of recent case-law, this contribution supports
the contention that, as a constitutional umpire, the ECJ takes its
role seriously, i.e. it is constantly seeking to strike the balance
imposed by the rule of law among the different interests at stake
in a multilayered system of governance. This type of analysis
does not aim to shield every ECJ judgment from criticism as to
its outcome and/or reasoning but serves to highlight that the
ECJ strives to achieve overall consistency in judicial decisionmaking as a basis of its legitimacy.
5. Id.. at 748.
6. Id.
7. Id., at 747.
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1. EXTERNAL AND INTERNALJUDICIAL LEGITIfACY
Judicial legitimacy may be examined from two different,
albeit complementary, perspectives. Externally, the legitimacy of
the judiciary and its role in democratic societies are deeply
intertwined, as it is only by defining what courts should do (and
what they should refrain from doing) that one may determine
whether they enjoy legitimacy. To that effect, one must first
define "what the law is," and only then appraise whether courts
are limiting themselves to "interpreting and applying the law." If
courts go beyond their duty of saying "what the law is," they lack
legitimacy as they intrude into the political process. By drawing
the borderline between law and politics, courts are in fact
drawing the contours of their own legitimacy. The imperative
need for courts to stand behind that line is, by no means, a
novel question, but it has accompanied them ever since
constitutionalism was born. As Chief Justice Marshall famously
articulated more than two hundred years ago, in Mlarbury v
Madison," whilst "[i] t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is," acts of a political
nature "can never be examinable by the courts." ' Drawing the
line between law and politics may be seen as a manifestation of
the principle of separation of powers which seeks to prevent
courts from undermining the prerogatives of the political
branches of government and thus, to preserve the "check and
balances" set out by the Founding Fathers.
Internally, legitimacy looks at the quality of the judicial
process. In systems such as the EU where the judicial function is
shared between the EU and the national judiciaries-i.e. where
that function is vertically integrated-legitimacy requires judicial
power to be allocated in accordance with the Treaties. This
means that judicial legitimacy is conditioned upon those two
types of courts acting with mutual respect and deference. An EU
court will be deprived of its legitimacy, not only if it intrudes
into the political sphere, at either EU or national level, but also
if it encroaches upon the prerogatives of national courts. The
same applies for the latter in relation to the prerogatives of EU

8. Alarbuy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
9. Id. at 166.
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courts.10 In a broader sense, given that no legal order operates
in isolation but interacts with other legal orders in a bilateral or
multilateral context, courts may not impinge upon the
competences that have been transferred to supranational or
international tribunals. Hence, in multilayered systems of
governance, the notion of "comity"' '-understood as a means of
guaranteeing a constructive judicial dialogue among different
courts-becomes of paramount importance to determine
whether a given court enjoys legitimacy. 2
In addition, internal legitimacy looks at courts as rational
actors, by focusing on the soundness of their legal reasoning.' 3
The question whether courts enjoy legitimacy thus amounts to
examining whether their rationale is sufficiently transparent and
easy to understand or whether it is cryptic; whether the grounds
ofjudgment are strong enough to be convincing and adequately
meet the arguments put forward by the parties; whether the
court's rulings are coherent with the existing case-law and based
on impartial criteria known in advance or whether they are
simply unpredictable and arbitrary.
External and internal judicial legitimacy complement each
other: the line between law and politics must be drawn in
accordance with the institutional capacities of the judicial
department, i.e. the lack of judicially manageable standards
implies that some decisions are not fit for judicial deliberations
but better left in the hands of the political process.
The ECJ strives to enjoy both external and internal
legitimacy. As a result of the constitutionalization of the Treaties
which transformed the European Union from an international
organization into a composite legal order, the ECJ has
continuously been called upon to uphold the rule of law as

10. See Opinion 1/09 [2011] E.C.R. 1-1137, 1 85 (holding that "the tasks
attributed to the national courts and to the Court of Justice respectively are
indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of the law established by the
Treatics").
11. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL jURISDICTION 39 (5th ed. 2007) (defining
comity" as "the deference federal courts owe to state courts as those of another
sovereign").
Jacobs, judicial Dialogu and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal
12. See, e.g., Francis
Systems: The European Court ofJustice, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 547 (2003).
13. See generaiy JOXERRAMON BLNGOLTXLA, THE LLAIL RE-ASONING OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEANJURTSPRUDENCE (1993).
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provided for by Article 19 TEU. As I mentioned twenty years
ago, one may distinguish three historical strands in the ECJ's
jurisprudence. 14
First, at the beginning of European integration, the ECJ was
confronted with the following problem: although the original
version of the EC Treaty commanded the ECJ to "ensure that in
the interpretation and application of [the Treaties] the law is
observed", it did not provide a definition of "the law."15 In order
to honor that constitutional mandate in a self-referential and, in
that sense, autonomous legal order, the ECJ could not limit
itself to a formalistic understanding of the rule of law.
Accordingly, it had no choice but to complete the constitutional
lacunae left by the authors of the Treaties. In so doing, the ECJ
was well aware of the fact that in order not to put at risk the
legitimacy of an incipient Union, EU law could not break away
from the constitutional traditions of the Member States. Thus, it
took a leading role in setting the founding principles of the EU
legal order by having recourse to the general principles of law
which provide a material constitutional content to the "law" of
the EU.16 The paradigmatic example of the gap-filling function
of the ECJ is the incorporation of fundamental rights into the
EU legal order as general principles of EU law. Furthermore, by
virtue of the principles of primacy and direct effect, individuals
are entitled to have the rights which EU law bestows upon them
enforced by national courts and, where appropriate, have
conflicting provisions of national law set aside by them. For
those rights to become more than empty promises, their
enforcement had to become a reality. To that end, the ECJ first
developed the principles of equivalence and effectiveness which
require national law on remedies not to discriminate against the
enforcement of EU rights and not to make the exercise of those
rights virtually impossible or excessively difficult.1 However,
14. Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts About the Interaction Between Judges atd Politicians
U. CuiL LEGALF. 93 (1992).

15. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 164, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
16. Koen Lenacrts & Jos6 A. Gutidrrcz-Fons. The ConstitutionalAllocation of Powers
and GeneralPrincpesofjEULaw, 47 COMMON MKT. L REV. 1629, 1632 (2010).
17. See Rew,-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewc-Zentral AG v. LandwirtschaftskainnCr fur
das Saarland. Case 33/76. [1976] E.C.R. 1989. 11 5-6; ComC BV v. Producktschap
voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R. 2043,
13; see also Koen Lenaerts,
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these two principles only seek to neutralize the effect of national
rules of procedure which hamper the proper enforcement of
EU law, but they are incapable of guaranteeing an effective
protection of EU rights where national law does not provide
sufficient injunctive or monetary relief. Hence, in a further
development of its case-law, the ECJ decided to enhance the
effective protection of EU rights by creating new remedies, this
time grounded in EU law itself.8
Second, the ECJ aimed to safeguard the core of European
integration set out in the Treaty by providing solutions to
problems that were expected to be tackled by the EU political
institutions but were not in practice as the latter could not reach
the then necessary consensus. It thus allowed interest-driven
litigation to overcome the political deadlock that prevented the
completion of the internal market, as free movers sought to tear
down barriers to trade that could have been eliminated by EU
harmonization. The principle of mutual recognition defined in
Cassis de Dijon best encapsulates this line of jurisprudence. 9 It
set in turn the stage for the Commission's action plan adopting
a "new approach" to remove obstacles to interstate trade,"
which, with the adoption of the Single European Act (the
"SEA"), was no longer governed by intergovernmental dynamics
given that Member States gave up their right to veto.2' Member
States thus accepted that EU internal market legislation could
be passed against their will and yet be binding upon them. As a
consequence, the establishment and functioning of the internal
market became an objective to be attained by both positive and
negative integration techniques, i.e. on the one hand, legislative
measures adopted by the Union political process and on the
National Remedies for PrivateParties in the Light of the EU Law Principles of Equivalence and
Effectienss, 46 IR.JURIST 13 (2011).

18. In relation to interim relief, see The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transport, ex
parte Factortanic Ltd., Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433. In relation to state liability
in damages, see Francovich v. Italy, joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R.
1-5357; Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. Germany, joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, [1996]
E.C.R. I-1029.
19. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesrnonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de
Dijon), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649.
20. See Commission of the European C omnunities, Completing the Internal
Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310
Final, 1 67-73 (June 1985).
21. See EEC art. 100a (now TFEU art. 114), supra note 15.
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other hand, enforcement by the ECJ of the prohibitions laid
down in the Treaties themselves to erect barriers to interstate
trade. The EU legislator and the ECJ are not in a competing
relationship when pursuing that objective. They are rather to be
seen as joining efforts.

Last, but not least, once the constitutional foundations of
the EU legal order were put in place and the establishment and
functioning of the internal market secured, the ECJ moved onto
a new paradigm. As the constitutional court of a more mature
legal order, it now tends to be less assertive as to the substantive
development of EU law. It sees its role primarily as one of
upholding the "check and balances" built into the EU
constitutional legal order of States and peoples, including the
protection of fundamental rights.22 This does not, however,
prevent the ECJ from taking a more proactive stand in some
areas of EU law, yet overall it displays greater deference to the
preferences of the EU legislator or, as the case may be, to those
of the Member States.3 The ECJ thus favors both continuity of
its role as a constitutional umpire and change in the substantive
EU law achieved by the traditional interaction between the
political and judicial processes.
One could look at those three strands through the prism of
the "activism v self-restraint" divide.24 A quick glance at them
might suggest that the first two are characterized by an activist
ECJ, whereas the third reveals an ECJ more committed to
judicial self-restraint. However, a critical observer may also argue
that in none of those three strands did the ECJ really engage in
22. See Lenaerts, supra note 14, at 95.
23. In the context of the law on reeindies, Takis Tridimas refers to that approach
as "selective deference." See TAKIS TRIDINLAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLLS OF EU LAw 418-

22 (2d ed. 2006).
24. See, e.g., Patrick Neill. The European Court ofJustice: A Case Study in Judicial
Activism, evidence submitted to the House of Lords Selcct Cornittee on the European
Communities, Subcommittee on the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference, Minutes of
Evidence, House of Lords, 18th Report, 218 et seq., (Session 1994-95) and the reply
given by David Edward. Judicial Activism-M',th or Reality ?, in LL(,AL REASONING AND
JU DICIAL INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IORD MACKENZIESTUARi 29-67 (Campbell et al. eds., 1996);see also Trevor C Harticy, The European
Court, Judicial Objectvity and the Constitution of the European Union, 112 LQ. REV. 93
(1996) and the reply given by Anthony Arnull, The Euopean Court and Judicial
Objectivity: A Repl to Professor Hartley, 112 L.Q. REV. 411 (1996). More recently, see
generally John Temnple Lang, Has the European Court ofJustice been involved in 'Judicial
Legislation "?96 SVENSKJUR1STTIDNING 299 (2011).
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judicial activism as it limited itself to doing what the Treaties
required it to do, i.e. to uphold the rule of law.2 In my view, this

shows that the "activism v self-restraint" discourse is
misconceived and does not lead to a productive discussion,
unless one first solves the following question: what should the
role of the ECJ be? In other words, how can the ECJ enjoy
external and internal legitimacy? It is to providing an answer to
those two questions that I now turn.
II. EXTERNAL LEGITIAL4CY
Part II of this contribution is devoted to examining how the
ECJ draws the line that divides the judicial process from the
realm of politics. Whilst Section A looks at the interactions
between the ECJ and the EU legislator, Section B explores how
the ECJ strives to accommodate, as far as possible, national
interests. That is so not only in the absence of EU
harmonization, but also where the EU legislator has adopted
secondary EU legislation.
A. The ECJ and the EUlegislator
When the ECJ interprets EU legislation, it must ensure that
the latter complies with primary EU law. However, in so doing, it
may not replace the choices made by the legislature by its own.
The ECJ is called upon to uphold simultaneously the principles
of hierarchy of norms and of separation of powers. If it is not
possible to interpret an act of secondary EU law in a way that
accommodates those two principles, then the ECJ will have no
choice but to annul that act or declare it invalid.
1. Reconciliatory Interpretation: An Example
If an act adopted by the EU legislator conflicts with the
Treaties, the ECJ will have no choice but to annul that act or
declare it invalid. However, in order to safeguard the legitimate
objectives pursued by the EU legislator, the ECJ will first do
everything within its jurisdiction to interpret secondary EU law

25. See, e.g., Christiaan Tiiiiiermiians,udicialActivisnand judicial Restraint,in THE
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COURFS 245 (Carl Baudenbacher et a]. eds., 2008).
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in accordance with primary EU law.2 It follows that, in so far as
the ECJ does not interpret secondary EU law in a contra legem
fashion,27 the annulment or declaration of invalidity of an act
adopted by the EU legislator operates as the ultima ratio in order
to uphold the rule of law. The judgment of the ECJ in Vatsouras
illustrates this point.
Originally, the ECJ ruled in Lebon2 9-decided in 1987-that
job-seekers' allowances did not fall within the scope of (then)
Community law. However, in Collins-decided seventeen years
later-the ECJ reconsidered its approach. By relying on the
Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, it ruled that the principle
of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality applies to such
allowances.so However, access to such allowances is not
unconditional, as it is legitimate for the host Member State to
subject the grant ofjob-seekers' allowances tojob-seekers having
established a "real link" with the labor market of that State. 3'
The ECJ acknowledged that a residence requirement is, in
principle, appropriate for the purposes of ensuring a "real link."
Nevertheless, such a requirement must comply with the
principle of proportionality, i.e. it must not go beyond what is
necessary to establish a "real link": the period of residence must

not exceed what is necessary in order for the national
authorities to be able to satisfy themselves that the person
concerned is genuinely seeking work in the employment market
of the host Member State; it must also be based on clear criteria

26. Karsten Engsig Sorensen, Reconciling Seconday Legislation and the Treaty Rights
of Free Movement, 36 EUR. L. REV. 339, 345 (2011) (wvho considers that reconciliatory
interpretation is "less likely to lead to an initer-institutional conflict and imore elegant in
resolving the issues without making it necessary to adopt new legislation").
27. Cf, Adeinder & Others v. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos [ELOG]. Case
C-212/04. [2006] E.C.R. 1-6057, 11 110-11.
28. See Vatsouras & Koupatantze v. Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE), joined Cases
C-22-2308. [2009] E.C.R. I-4585.
29. Centre Public de I'Aide Sociale, Courcelles v. Lebon, Case 316/85. [1987]
E.C.R. 1-2811, 1 26. See Commission v. Belgium, Case C-278/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-4307,
39-40.
30. Collins v. Sec'y of State for Work & Pensions, Case C-138/02, [2004] E.C.R.
1-2703, 1 63; Office Nat'l de Il'Emploi 'v. loannidis, Case C-258/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-827,
1 22.
31. D'Hoop v. Office NaL'1 de 1Enploi', Case C-224/98' [2002] E.C.R. 1-6191,
38; Collins, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2703, 1 69; loannidis, [2005] E.C.R. 1-827, 1 30.

1312 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1302
known in advance; and provision must be made for access to a
means of redress of ajudicial nature.3 2
On April 29, 2004, the EU legislator adopted the Citizen's
Rights Directive (the "CRD"),33 whose Article 24(2) reads as
follows: "[b]y way of derogation from [the principle of equal
treatment], the host Member State shall not be obliged to
confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three
months of residence or, where appropriate, the longer period
provided for in Article 14(4) (b)."34 Arguably, an interpretation
of this provision based solely on its wording could suggest that
the concept of "social assistance" laid down therein includes
"benefit[s] of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to
employment in the labour market of [the host] Member
State." 6 Such a reading would, however, imply-contrary to
Collins-that,regardless of the existence of a "real link" between
job-seekers and the labor market of the host Member State, the
former would not be entitled to job-seekers' allowances in spite
of the fact that they "can provide evidence that they are
continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine
chance of being engaged" but have not become permanent
residents. Bearing in mind that the findings of the ECJ in Collins
are grounded in primary EU law, such a reading of Article 24(2)
of the CRD would be incompatible with that law. That is why in
Vatsouras,36 the referring court called into question the
compatibility of Article 24(2) of the CRD with Article 18 TFEU,
read in conjunction with Article 45 TFEU, asking whether it was
possible to reconcile the "real link" approach put forward in
Collins with Article 24(2) of the CR). The ECJ replied in the
affirmative. At the outset, it confirmed its previous findings in
Collins, according to which "nationals of the Member States

32. Collins. [2004] E.C.R. 1-2703, 1[ 72.
33. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely
Within the Territory of the Member States, 2004 O.J. L 158/77 [hereinafter Parliament
and Council Directive on Citizens' Free Movement and Residence Rights].
34. See Parliament and Council Directive on Citizens' Free Movement and
Residence Rights, supra note 33, art.14(4)(b), at 104, (referring to the period during
which "the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek
employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged").
35. Collins. [2004] E.C.R. I-2703, 1[ 63.
36. Vatsours & Koupatantze, [2009] E.C.R. 1-4585.
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seeking employment in another Member State who have
established real links with the labour market of that State can
rely on Article [45(2) TFEU] in order to receive a benefit of a
financial nature intended to facilitate access to the labour
market." 7 The ECJ then proceeded to interpret Article 24(2) of
the CRD in light of Article 45(2) TFEU, since it considered that
a literal interpretation of Article 24(2) of the CRD was
overinclusive and consequently, the concept of "social
assistance," understood in its natural and ordinary meaning,
needed to be narrowed down. Hence, benefits of a financial
nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labor
market of the host Member State fall outside the scope of that
provision." This includes not only job-seekers' allowances, but
also any financial benefit whose purpose is "to promote
integration into the labour market."" Thus, in relation to jobseekers' allowances, Article 24(2) of the CRD does not apply. It
is for the national court to determine, in light of Collins, whether
a job-seeker has established sufficient connections with the
society of the host Member State.
2. Primary EU Law and the Objectives Pursued by the ELU
Legislator
Moreover, the ECJ strives to provide a solution which
accommodates both the objectives pursed by the EU legislator
and primary EU law. For example, if the challenged provision of
secondary EU law not only conflicts with primary EU law but is
also inconsistent with the objectives pursued by the EU
legislator, then the ECJ will have fewer difficulties in annulling
or invalidating such provision. On the contrary, if by
interpreting secondary EU law in light of primary EU law, the
ECJ manages to enhance the objectives pursued by the EU
legislator, then it will tend to follow such reconciliatory
interpretation rather than to annul or invalidate the challenged
act of secondary EU law. These two different outcomes are

37. Id.
38. Id.

40.
45.

39. See Opinion of Advocate

E.C.R. I-4585,1[ 57.

General

Ruiz(arabo Coloiner,

Vatsouras

[2009]
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highlighted by comparing the ruling of the ECJ in Test-Achats
with that in Sturgeon & Others.4 1
In Test-Achats, the referring court asked the ECJ whether
Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/11342 was valid in light of the
principle of equal treatment between men and women." Article
5 (1) of Directive 2004/113 implements that principle in relation
to actuarial factors. It provides that the differences in premiums
and benefits arising from the use of sex as a factor in the
calculation thereof must be abolished by December 21, 2007 at
the latest.4 4 By way of derogation, the second paragraph of
Article 5 of Directive 2004/113 stated that it was permitted for
Member States to introduce proportionate differences in
individuals' premiums and benefits where the use of sex was a
determining factor in the assessment of risk based on relevant
and accurate actuarial and statistical data.4 5 If a Member State
made use of that option before December 21, 2007, its decision
had to be reviewed five years after that date, account being
taken of a Commission report.
At the outset, the ECJ stressed that Directive 2004/113
expressly refers to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter.
Accordingly, the validity of Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113
had to be determined in light of those two provisions. Next, the
ECJ looked at the Treaty provisions which define the principle
of equal treatment between men and women as a social
objective to be attained by the European Union, namely the
second subparagraph of Article 3(3) TEU and Articles 8, 19(1)
and 157(1) TFEU. In this regard, it pointed out that "[iun the
progressive achievement of that equality, it is the EU legislature
40. Assoc. Belge des Consonmateurs Test-Achats ASBL & Others v. Conseil des
Ministres, Case C-236/09, [2011] E.C.R. 1-773.
41. Sturgeon & Others v. Air France SA, Joined Cases C-402/07 & 432/07, [2009]
E.C.R. I-10, 923.
42. Council Directive 2004/113/EC Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment Between Men and Women in the Access to and Supply of Goods and
Services, 2004 O.J. L 373/37 [hereinafter Access to Goods and Services Directive].
43. Assoc. Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL & Others, [2011] E.C.R. I773. 1 14.
44. See Access to Goods and Services Directive, supra note 42, art. 5. at 41.
45. Id. art. 5, at 41. This meant, for example, that national law could allow car
insurance companies to impose higher premiums on men than on women given that.
in accordance with statistical data, inen have a higher risk of causing a car accident

than women.
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which [ ... ] determines when it will take action, having regard
to the development of economic and social conditions within
the European Union."4 6 This meant, for example, that, since the
use of actuarial factors related to sex was a widespread practice
in the Member States, it was permissible for the EU legislator to
provide for the appropriate transitional period. This was actually
the rationale underpinning Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/113
which sets 21 December 2007 as the deadline for the
implementation of the principle of equal treatment between
men and women in relation to actuarial factors. By contrast,
Article 5(2) contained a derogation from that principle which
was subject to no temporal limitation. "[Gliven that Directive
2004/113 is silent as to the length of time during which those
differences may continue to be applied", the ECJ observed,
"Member States which have made use of the option are
permitted to allow insurers to apply the unequal treatment
without any temporal limitation. " 47
The Council supported the validity of Article 5(2) of
Directive 2004/113, arguing that, in the context of certain
branches of private insurance, the respective situations of male
and female policyholders may not be regarded as comparable,
given that, in light of statistical data, the levels of insured risk
may be different for men and for women. However, the ECJ
took a different view. According to Recitals 18 and 19 of
Directive 2004/113, the latter favored the application of rules of
unisex premiums and benefits. Accordingly, "Directive
2004/113 is based on the premise that [...] the respective
situations of men and women with regard to insurance
premiums and benefits contracted by them are comparable."48
For the ECJ, Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113:
which enables the Member States in question to maintain
without temporal limitation an exemption from the rule of
unisex

premiums

and

benefits,

works

against

the

46. Assoc. Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL & Others, [ 2011] E. C.R. I-773,

1

20.
47. Id. 1 26.
48. Id. 1 30. Of course, one could call into question whether that premise was well
founded. See Philippa Watson, Equalit. Fundamnental Rights and the Limit
Legislative Discretion: Comment on Test-Achats, 36 EUR. L. RLV. 896 (2011). Be that
as it may, this was not the question that the E(J was asked to examine in Test-

Achats and Others.
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achievement of the objective of equal treatment between
men and women, which is the purpose of Directive
2004/113, and is incompatible with Ai ticles 21 and 23 of the

Charter.49

Consequently, that provision was held to be invalid upon the
expiry of an appropriate transitional period, i.e. December 21,
2012.))
In Sturgeon & Others, the ECJ was asked whether Regulation

No. 261/200451 confers a right to compensation upon airline
passengers in the event of delay. 5 The wording of Regulation
No. 261/2004 does not expressly create a right to compensation
for those passengers whose flight is delayed, as opposed to

passengers whose flight is cancelled, on whom such a right is
explicitly conferred." Can this legislative silence be read as
denying compensation to this category of passengers? The ECJ
replied in the negative. It began by observing that, in the light of
its objectives, Regulation No. 261/2004 does not exclude
awarding compensation to passengers whose flight is merely
delayed. Nor does Regulation No. 261/2004 rule out the
possibility that, for the purposes of recognition of the right to
compensation, both categories of passengers can be treated
alike.54 Next, the ECJ noted that, in accordance with a general
principle of interpretation, "a [Union] act must be interpreted
in such a way as not to affect its validity." 5 This means that a
Union act must be interpreted in compliance with superior rules
49. Assoc. Belge des Consommatears Test-Achats ASBL & Others, [2011] E.C.R. 1-773,
32. See C. Tobler, Case Note on Case C-236/09, Association belge des
Consomrnmateurs Test-Achats and Others, 48 COMMON MKT. L REV. 2041, 2060 (2011)
(observing that "[t]he [E(J]'s finding in Test-Achats in essence implies a criticism of the
legislative decisions made by the Council in adopting Directive 2004/113").
50. See Access to Goods and Services Directive, supra note 42,
19, at 39. 21
December 2012 is the date on which the decision to derogate from the principle of
equal treatment between men and women laid down in Artice 5(2) of Directive
2004/113 was to be reviewed by the Member State concerned.
51. Council Regulation No. 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council Establishing Common Rules on Compensation and Assistance to Passengers in
the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or Long Delay of Flights, and
Repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, 2004 OJ. L 46/1 [hereinafter Regulation No.
261/2004].
52 Sturgeon & Others, [2009] E.C. R. 1-10923, 1 25.
53 See Regulation No. 261 /2004. art. 5 (1) (c), at 4.
54. Sturgeon & Others, [2009] E.C.R. I-10923. 1 46.
55. Id. 147.

1
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of EU law, including the principle of equal treatment. Hence,
where passengers whose flight is cancelled and passengers whose
flight is delayed are in a comparable situation, Regulation No.
261/2004 must be interpreted in such a way as to treat both
categories of passengers equally. To this effect, the ECJ noted
that both categories of passengers suffer similar damage,
consisting in a loss of time. In particular, the situation of
passengers whose flight is delayed is comparable to that of
passengers who are informed upon arrival at the airport that
their flight is cancelled and subsequently re-routed in
accordance with Article 5 of Regulation No. 261/2004. Since
Article 5 (1) (c) (iii) of Regulation No. 261/2004 only provides
for a right to compensation where the cancellation of a flight
and its subsequent re-routing entail a loss of time equal to or in
excess of three hours, the same should apply in the event of
delay.56 Therefore, the ECJ ruled that in order for Regulation
No. 261/2004 to comply with the principle of equal treatment, it
had to be interpreted so as to grant a right to compensation to
passengers whose flight is delayed and who reach their final
destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally
scheduled by the air carrier. Finally, the ECJ recalled that air
carriers are not obliged to pay compensation where they
manage to prove that cancellations and delays are caused by
extraordinary circumstances. 7
The approach followed by AG Sharpston was somewhat
different. She concurred with the ECJ in acknowledging that if
compensation to passengers whose flight is delayed were
excluded, then it would be impossible to reconcile Regulation
No. 261/2004 with the principle of equal treatment. Yet, in
contrast to the ECJ, the Advocate General did not provide a
particular time-limit after which passengers whose flight is
delayed enjoy a right to compensation. In her view, "the actual
selection of a magic figure is a legislative prerogative."58
However, the ECJ deployed another argument in order to
counter this separation-of-powers objection. It invoked Recital
56. Id.
57. Id.

57.
6 7 (noting that extraordinary circumstances are defined as those which

are beyond the air carrier's actual control").
58. See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Sturgeon & Others v. Air France

SAJoined Cases C-402/07 & 432/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-10923,

11

93-94.
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15 in the preamble of Regulation No. 261/2004, whereby "the
legislature [ ... ] linked the notion of 'long delay' to the right to
compensation." Thus, the ECJ did not encroach upon the
prerogatives of the EU legislator but simply limited itself to
clarifying a legislative choice already contained in Regulation
No. 261/2004, namely the distinction between "delay" (inferior
to three hours) and "long delay" (equal to or in excess of three
hours). Whilst the latter gives rise to compensation, the former
does not.59
More recently, in Nelson & Others, several airlines, the
International Air Transport Association ("IATA") and the UK
called into question the validity of Articles 5 and 7 of Regulation
No. 261/2004, as interpreted by the ECJ in Sturgeon & Others, on
the ground that that judgment was at odds with the principles of
legal certainty and proportionality.o They urged the ECJ (Grand
Chamber) to depart from its findings in Sturgeon & Others (a
ruling given by a Chamber of five judges). '
As to the principle of legal certainty, they posited that the
method of interpretation followed by the ECJ in Sturgeon &
Others was incompatible with paragraph 76 of the LATA and
ELFAA judgment. In the latter case, the ECJ conceded that
Recitals 14 and 15 of the Preamble of Regulation No. 261/2004
gave "the impression that, generally, operating air carriers
should be released from all their obligations in the event of
extraordinary circumstances, and it accordingly gives rise to a
certain ambiguity between the intention thus expressed by the
[EU] legislature and the actual content of Articles 5 and 6 of
Regulation No. 261/2004 which do not make this defence to
liability so general in character." "However", the ECJ added,
"such an ambiguity does not extend so far as to render
incoherent the system set up by those two articles, which are
themselves entirely unambiguous."62 For the applicants, this
meant that, in Sturgeon & Others, the ECJ should not have relied
upon Recital 15 of Regulation No. 261/2004 with a view to
59. See Sturgeon & Others, [2009] E.C.R. I-10923, 1[ 62.
60. See Nelson & Othiers, Joined Cases C-581/10 & 629/10. [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered Oct. 23, 2012) (not yet reported).
61 Id. 1[ 62. 73.
62. See hIn'l Air Transp. Assoc. & European Low Fares Airlines Assoc. v. Dep't of
Transp., Case C-344/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-403, [ 76.
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modifying the meaning of the relevant provisions of that
Regulation. The ECJ took, nonetheless, a different view: "as
regards [...] the relationship between the judgments in IATA
and ELFAA and Sturgeon [&] Others, it is apparent [...] that
there is no tension between those two judgments, the second
judgment applying the principles laid down by the first."61 As
explained by AG Bot, a distinction should be drawn between the
question of interpretation raised in IATA and ELFAA and that
raised in Sturgeon & Others. In the former case, the ECJ
explained that the ambiguity which may arise on reading
Recitals 14 and 15 of the Preamble of Regulation No. 261/2004
could not call into question the fact that the body of that
Regulation made clear that the defence of extraordinary
circumstances is not a general rule but applies only to the
obligation to pay compensation. Conversely, in Sturgeon &
Others, the question whether long delays may give rise to
compensation could not be answered by looking at the relevant
provisions of Regulation No. 261/2004. Thus, the ECJ was right
to examine Recital 15 of the Preamble thereof.
In relation to the principle of proportionality, the
applicants argued that, as interpreted by the ECJ in Stungeon &
Others, Regulation No. 261/2004 would impose an excessive
63. Nelson & Others, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered Oct. 23, 2012). In paragraph
45 of IATA and ELFAA the E(,J found that the authors of the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, concluded in Montreal
on 28 May 1999, signed by the European Community on 9 December 1999 and
approved on its behalf by Council Decision 2001/539/EC 2001 OJ. L 194/38,
[hereinafter Montreal Convention] did not intend "to shied those [air] carriers from
any other form of intervention, in particular action which could be envisaged by the
public authorities to redress, in a standardised and immediatC manner, the damage
that is constituted by the inconvenience that delay in the carriage of passengers by air
causes, without the passengers having to suffer the inconvenience inherent in the
bringing of actions for damages before the courts." See also Nelson & Others, [2012]
E.C.R. I
(delivered Oct. 23 2012). Stated differently, the Montreal Convention
does not prevent public authorities from redressing, in a standardized and immediate
manner, the damage that is constituted by the inconvenience that delay in the carriage
of passengers by air causes. In IATA and ELFAA, the E J ruled that "the assistance and
taking care of passengers envisaged by Article 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 in the
event of a long delay to a flight constitute such standardized and immediate
compensatory measures." See LITA and ELFAA, [2006] E.C.R. 1-403. 1f 46. In the same
way, in Sturgeon, the compensation envisaged by Article 7 of Regulation No. 261/2004
in the event of a long delay to a flight also constitutes such a standardised and
immediate compensa[ory measure, which the Montreal Convention does not oppose.

See Nelson & Others, [2012] E.C.R. I

(delivered Oct. 23, 2012).

1320 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1302
burden on air carriers as they would have to provide
compensation to passengers suffering a loss of time equal to or
in excess of three hours. They also pointed out that the financial
cost brought about by that compensation would be passed on to
passengers by means of an increase in fares or a reduction in the
number of flights from local airports and services to outlying
destinations.64 Whilst acknowledging that that compensation
may entail certain financial consequences to air carriers, the ECJ
found that "those consequences cannot be considered
disproportionate to the aim of ensuring a high level of
protection for air passengers."6 First, not all delays may give rise
to compensation, but only long delays.66 Second, provided that
the conditions laid down in Article 7(2) (c) of Regulation No.
261/2004 are met, the amount of compensation may be reduced
by fifty percent.67 Third, compensation is excluded where the
delay in question is caused by "extraordinary circumstances" as
defined by the case-law of the ECJ.68 Fourth, air carriers having
paid compensation to passengers suffering long delays may seek
to recover that amount from any person who caused the delay.('
Fifth, statistics show that "the proportion of flights for which
delay confers entitlement to the compensation provided for
under Regulation No 261/2004 is less than 0.15%."70 Sixth,
applicants failed to provide evidence showing that "the payment
of compensation in the event of long delays to flights would give
rise to an increase in fares or a reduction in the number of
flights from local airports and services to outlying
destinations."7 1 Most importantly, recalling its previous ruling in
Vodafone & Others,7 2 the ECJ held that "the importance of the
objective of consumer protection, which includes the protection

64. Nelson & Others, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered Oct. 23, 2012).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Sturgeon & Others, joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07, [2009] E.C.R.
1-10923 1 67: see also McDonagh, Case C-12/11, [2013] E.C.R. I
(delivered January,
31 2013) (not yet reported).

69.
70.
71.
72.

Nelson & Others, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered 23 October 2012).
Id.
Id.
Vodafone and Others, Case C-58/08, [2010] E.C.R. 1-4999, 1 53, 69.
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of air passengers, may justify even substantial negative economic
consequences for certain economic operators."
As a result, the ECJ held that " consideration [of the
questions referred for a preliminary ruling] has disclosed no
factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Articles 5 to 7 of
Regulation No 261/2004."
The problems with which the ECJ was confronted in TestAchats and Sturgeon & Others are, to some extent, similar. First,
in both cases, the ECJ had to review the compatibility of an act
of secondary EU law with the principle of equal treatment.
Second, in both cases, the alleged incompatibility of the
challenged EU act resulted from a lacuna contained therein. In
Test-Achats, Directive 2004/113 was silent as to whether the
derogation laid down in Article 5(2) was subject to a temporal
limitation. In the same way, in Sturgeon, the wording of
Regulation No. 261/2004 does not expressly create a right to
compensation for those passengers whose flight is delayed.
However, in Test-Achats the ECJ declared Article 5(2) of the
Directive 2004/113 invalid, whereas in Sturgeon it decided to
construe Regulation No. 261/2004 so as to award a right to
compensation to passengers whose flight is delayed for more
than three hours. How can these two different outcomes be
explained? Did the ECJ engage in judicial activism in these
cases?75 In my view, the approach followed by the ECJ in both

73. Nelson & Others, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered 23 October 2012).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., John Balfour. Airline Liabilit for Delays: The Court ofJustice of the EU
Rewrites EC Regulation 261/2004, 35 AIR & SPACE IAW/v 71, at 75 (2010) (arguing that
[t] he disregard of clear provisions of EU regulations and rewriting of them by the
[E( J] raises scrious concerns about the rule of law in the EU that [go] far beyond the
interests of just airlines and passengers. It would be regrettable if this deeply
unsatisfactory judgment was allowed to stand unchallenged"). But see Temple Lang,
supra note 24, at 309 (positing that " [i] t is understandable that neither the [ECJ] nor
the Advocate, General wished to declare the Regulation invalid because it was
discriminatoly, because that would have deprived many airline passengers of a right to
compensation"); Cces van Dam, Air Passenger Rights After Sturgeon, 36 AIR & SPACE
LAW 260, 265 (2011) (positing that -[t]he airlines may be right to point out that, also
in Sturgeon, the principle of legal certainty was at stake. However, even though the
[E( J] did not explicitly refer to this principle, it will probably have concluded that, in
the context of the questions referred by the national courts, it had to give way to the
principle of equal trcatlnent. Legal principles do not have an absolute value and often
conflict with each other. It is one of the [ECJ]'s tasks to reconcile them or to give way
to one to the detriment of the other"); Sacha Garben, Sky-high Controversy and High-
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Sturgeon and Test-Achats is not only consistent, but more
importantly, it is deferential to the policy choices of the EU
legislator. Indeed, a close reading of Sturgeon and Test-Achats
reveals that the ECJ limited itself to applying the principle of
equal treatment so as to enhance the objectives pursued by the
EU legislator.
It is worth noting that, in Sturgeon & Others, Regulation No.
261/2004 seeks primarily to ensure a high level of protection for
all passengers who suffer from similar serious trouble and
inconvenience connected with air transport.7 6 As an act of
judicial deference to the EU legislator, the ECJ sought not to
call into question that level of protection, whilst at the same time
ensuring compliance with the principle of equal treatment. This
meant, in essence, that Regulation No. 261/2004 had to be
construed so as to expand the categories of passengers
benefiting from those rights, rather than inviting the EU
legislator to revisit the entire scheme set out in this Regulation.
A joint reading of the principle of equal treatment and the
objectives pursued by Regulation No. 261/2004 favored pushing
the bounds of interpretation to the utmost (though not beyond
the limits of contra legem) in order not to adversely affect the
high level of protection already put in place by the EU legislator.
By contrast, in Test-Achats, the challenged provision of Directive
2004/113 was a derogation from the objectives pursued by that
Directive, namely the application of rules of unisex premiums
and benefits. Article 5(2) was thus inconsistent with the
objectives pursued by Directive 2004/113. Just as it does in

Flying Clains? The Sturgeon Case Law in Light ofudicial Ativism, Earoscepticism and
Eurolegalism, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 15, 45 (2013) (arguing that "[w]c have seen
that although there are good reasons to be critical of the ruling, especially with regard
to the poor quality of legal reasoning, the outcome of the case can be defended. The
[ECJ] has rightly taken a forceful approach in the protection of European consumers.
providing a necessary counterbalance to the EU-induced privatization of the air travel
sector").

76. See, e.g., Sturgeon & Others, Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07. [2009]
E.C.R. 1-10923, 1[ 44-45 (holding that "it is apparent frorn Recitals I to 4 in the
preamble, in particular from Recital 2, that the regulation seeks to ensure a high lcvel
of protection for air passengers regardless of whether they are denied boarding or
whether their flight is cancelled or delayed, since they are all caused similar serious
trouble and inconvenience connected with air transport"). Hence, the ECJ ruled that
the provisions conferring rights on air passengers, including those conferring a right

to compensation, must be interpreted broadly").
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testing the compatibility of national measures with EU law,7 the
ECJ required in Test-Achats that there should be no internal
inconsistencies in secondary EU law, when it verifies the validity
of that law in light of primary EU law.
3. Judicial Deference to Legislative Choices
When the ECJ is called upon to interpret secondary EU law,
it must respect the framework laid down by the EU legislator.
Hence, contrary to primary EU law, which must be interpreted
as a "living constitution" capable of coping with societal
changes, the ECJ must refrain from rewriting secondary EU law,
even if the latter is outdated or no longer fulfills the objectives it
pursues. The role of the ECJ is indeed neither to anticipate nor
to pre-empt policy choices that fall within the purview of the EU
legislator. The ruling of the ECJ in Commission v. Spain illustrates
this point.78
One should briefly recall that an EU citizen has the right to
receive cross-border healthcare services under two co-existing
regimes. On the one hand, there is Regulation No. 883/20047
which entered into force on 1 May 2010, replacing Regulation
No. 1408/71.8 1 Regulation No. 883/2004 lays down a system of
prior authorization. On the other hand, there are the Treaty
provisions on the freedom to provide (or receive) services as
interpreted by the ECJ. It is worth noting that the case-law of the
ECJ under these Treaty provisions has been largely codified by
the recently adopted Directive 24/2011 (the Patient's Rights
Directive, the "PRD"). 81 In relation to cases of "scheduled
treatment", it may happen that the coverage of a treatment is
lower in the Member State of stay than in the Member State of
affiliation. For such a situation, the ECJ held in Vanbraekel that
"Article [56 TFEU] is to be interpreted as meaning that, if the
77. For lurther discussion, see infra Part II, Section 11.1ii.
78. Conmission v. Spain, Case C-211/08. [2010] E.C.R. 1-5267.
79. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
on the Coordination of Social Security Systems, No. 883/2004, 2004 0.. L 166/ 1.
80. Council Regulation of 14 June 1971 on the Application of Social Security
Schemes to Employed Persons and Their Families Moving Within the Comniunity, No.

1408/71, 1986 O.J. L 266/39.
81. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on
the Application of Patients' Rights in Cross-border Healthcare, No. 2011/24, 2011 OJ.

L 88/45. The deadline for transposing that Directive is 23 October 2013.

1324 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1302
reimbursement of costs incurred on hospital services provided
in a Member State of stay, calculated under the rules in force in
that State, is less than the amount which application of the
legislation in force in the Member State of registration would
afford to a person receiving hospital treatment in that State,
additional reimbursement covering that difference must be
granted to the insured person by the competent institution." 2
This is known as the "Vanbraekel reimbursement."
In Commission v Spain, the ECJ held that the "Vanbraekel
reimbursement" does not apply to people who travel to other
Member States for purposes other than receiving medical care,
i.e. persons who claim the reimbursement of the healthcare
incurred in the Member State of stay under Article 22 (1) (a)
Regulation 1408/71 (now Article 19 of Regulation No.
883/2004)." First, it stressed that, unlike scheduled treatment,
national legislation denying the "Vanbrackel reimbursement" in
cases of unscheduled treatment "cannot be regarded as having
any restrictive effect on the provision of hospital treatment
services by providers established in another Member State," 8 4
given that the unexpected character of that type of treatment
does not induce the insured person to cancel his or her trip.
Second, the ECJ found that the contested legislation could not,
in general terms, be regarded as restricting the freedom to
provide hospital treatment services, tourist services or
educational services, since it appears too uncertain and indirect
to consider that the person insured in the Member State of
affiliation would be induced not to leave that Member State or
to return there early in order to receive medical treatment.8
Finally, the ECJ ruled that its interpretation of Article 56 TFEU
was consistent with "the principle of overall compensation of
risks" laid down in Articles 22 (1) (a) and 36 of Regulation No.
1408/71 (now Articles 19 and 35 of Regulation No. 883/2004).
In accordance with that principle, cases in which the hospital
treatment provided for in the Member State of stay is of a higher
financial cost than that offered in the Member State of
affiliation are offset by cases in which the hospital treatment
82.
83
84.
85.

Vanbraekel & Others, Case C-368/98, [2001] E.C. R. 1-5363,
Commission v. Spain, [2010] E.C.R. I-5267. 11 63-65.
Id. 65.
Id. 72.

53.
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provided for in the Member State of stay is of a lower cost.&
Otherwise, the ECJ reasoned, the Member State of affiliation
would be systematically exposed to the highest financial burden.
According to Van der Mei,"7 the ruling of the ECJ in
Commission v Spain has been superseded by Article 7(4) of the
PRD, since the latter does not distinguish between scheduled
and unscheduled treatment. Indeed, that provision states that:
"[t] he costs of cross-border healthcare shall be reimbursed
or paid directly by the Member State of affiliation up to the level
of costs that would have been assumed by the Member State of
affiliation, had this healthcare been provided in its territory
without exceeding the actual costs of healthcare received."
Van der Mei relies on this occurrence with a view to
criticising the ruling of the ECJ in Commission v Spain. Alter
looking at the legislative process that led to the enactment of the
PRD, he observes that, in relation to Article 7(4) thereof, "no
objections were raised, and no amendments were proposed.""
Indeed, ever since it was included in the original 2008
Commission proposal, Article 7(4) of the PRD remained
unchanged. Hence, the EU legislator (including the Member
States) appeared not to be opposed to the application of the
"Vanbraekel
reimbursement"
to
unscheduled
hospital
treatment. In his view, Commission v Spain gave rise to a "unique
and reverse situation, in which the Member States prove to be
more 'patient-friendly' than the overly conservative [EC]." 8 9
Even if one were to assume that Article 7(4) of the PRD
applies to unscheduled treatments, which is far from being
clear,"1 I cannot agree with such criticism. By qualifying the ECJ
as a "patient-friendly" or as an "overly conservative" court, one

86. Id. 11 78-79.
87. See generally Anne Picter Van der Mei, Cross-border Access to Healthcare and
Entitlement t Complementary "Vanbraekel Reinbursenent", 36 EUR. L. REV. 431, 431-32
(2011).
88 Id. at 439.
89. Id.
90. See 28th recital of the PRD, which states that " [the PRD] should not affect an
insured pcrson's rights in respect of the assumption of costs of healthcare which
becomes necessary on medical grounds during a temporary stay in another Member
State according to Regulation (E() No 883/2004." Directive 2011/24/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council on The Application of Paticns' Rights in
Cross-border Healthcare, 2004 O.J. L 88/45, art. 28 at L 88/248.
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embarks onto the wrong debate. Those two adjectives refer to
policy considerations and should therefore be reserved to the
appraisal of the work done by the political process. In
Commission v Spain, the ECJ limited itself to examining the
compatibility of Spanish legislation with Article 56 TFEU; it
found that Article 56 TFEU does not require Member States to
award the "Vanbraekel reimbursement" to unscheduled hospital
treatment. In so doing, it effectively held that the award of such
reimbursement in the event of unscheduled hospital treatment
was a matter for the EU legislator alone to determine as it
involved policy choices concerning financial trade-offs in the
healthcare budgets of the Member States, as the money spent on
moving patients is not being spent on other patients' needs.
Thus, it is wrong to say that the ECJ was not "patient-friendly" or
"overly conservative." One can only infer from Commission v
Spain that the ECJ is seriously committed to leaving policy
choices in the hands of the EU legislator, where they actually
belong if the EU is to be seen as a system based on
representative democracy.91
B. The ECJ and the Member States
The ECJ strives to strike the balance imposed by the rule of
law between national and EU interests. In the absence of EU
harmonizing measures, the ECJ strikes that balance where a
Member State relies on national identity or on public health
considerations with a view to derogating from the Treaty
91. See Commission v. Germany, Case-205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 1 55;
Commission v. France, Casc-220/83, [1986] E.C.R. 3663, 1 20; Commission v.
Denmark, Case-252/83, [1986] E.C.R. 3713, 1 20; Commission v. Ireland, Casc-206/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 3817, 1 20. In those cases, the EC held that the lundamental freedoms
did not preclude the Member State in which insurance serviccs are provided from
imposing on insurance companics established in another Member State the obligation
to obtain a separate authorisation. However, in order to ensure compliance with EU
(then Community) law, the granting of such an authorization had to be subject to
certain conditions. It follows from those judgments that the establishment of a system
of a single authorization would thus require the EU (then Community) legislator to
adopt harmonising measures in the insurance sector. See also Kcrckhaert and Morres v.
Bclgische Staat, Case C-513/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,967,
22-24 (holding that the
fundamental freedoms do not require the elimination of double taxation resulting
from the parallel exercise by the Member States concerned of their respective powers
of taxation. This required a political solution to be adopted by the EU legislator or

through double tax conventions concluded by the Member States).
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provisions on free movement and EU citizenship. By contrast,
when EU harmonizing measures have been adopted, the ECJ
weighs national interests against the objectives pursued by the
EU legislator.
1. In the Absence of EU Harmonization
i. The Importance of Constitutional Principles Embedded in
National Law
In the absence of EU harmonization, and in so far as there
are no national measures producing a protectionist effect (or
having a protectionist intent), Member States enjoy a broad
leeway to safeguard national interests which are deemed
fundamental to their identity. Beyond a core nucleus of shared
values where the ECJ must ensure uniformity, EU law cannot
disregard the cultural, historical, and social heritage that is part
and parcel of national constitutional traditions. In other words,
beyond that core nucleus, the ECJ welcomes "value diversity."92
The rulings of the ECJ in Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein illustrate
this approach. 3
In Omega, the Bonn police authority prohibited Omega
from offering games involving the simulated killing of human
beings on the ground that they infringed human dignity. Given
that Omega had entered into a franchise contract with a British
company, it argued that the ban was contrary to the freedom to
provide services embodied in ex Article 49 EC (now Article 56
TFEU). Thus, the ECJ was called upon to strike a balance
between ex Article 49 EC and human dignity, as understood by a
national authority. After noting that the ban constituted a
restriction on the freedom to provide services which,
nevertheless, pursued a legitimate objective-the protection of
human dignity-, the ECJ ruled that, for the purposes of
applying the principle of proportionality, "[i]t is not
indispensable

[

. . .

] for the restrictive measure issued by the

authorities of a Member State to correspond to a conception
shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which
92. See Lenaerts & Gutierrez-Fons, supra note 15, at 1663-64.
93. Onega
Spielhallen
und
Automatenautfstellungs-GinbH
V.
Oberbirgerncisterin de Bundesstadt Bonn ( 0 imega), Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R.
1-9609 and Sayn-Wittgenstein v. von Wien, Case C-208/09, [2010] E.C.R. 1-13693.
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the fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to be
protected."9 4 Thus, the fact that a Member State other than
Germany had chosen a system of protection of human dignity
less restrictive of the freedom to provide services did not imply
that the German measure was contrary to the EC Treaty. Given
that the ban satisfied the level of protection required by the
German constitution and did not go beyond what was necessary
to that effect, the ECJ considered that it was a justified
restriction on the freedom to provide services. Thus, Omega
demonstrates that the ECJ did not seek to impose a common
conception of human dignity. Nor did it embrace the national
conception prevailing outside Germany which was more
protective of free movement. Instead, it endorsed a model based
on "value diversity", where national constitutional traditions are
not in competition with the economic objectives of the Union,
but form an integral part of them.95
The ECJ followed the same approach in Sayn-Wittgenstein.
The facts of the case were as follows. In 2003, the Austrian
Constitutional Court delivered a judgment in which it
interpreted the Law on the abolition of the nobility, which
enjoys a constitutional status as it implements the principle of
equal treatment in this field. It held that the Law on the
abolition of the nobility prohibits Austrian citizens from bearing
titles of nobility, including those of foreign origin. This meant
for Ilonka Ffirstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein-an Austrian national
residing in Germany who took the name of her German
stepfather-that all official documents delivered by Austrian
authorities could no longer contain the noble elements "Filrstin
von", i.e. her surname could only be registered as "SaynWittgenstein." The latter, who had been using the prefix
"Filirstin von" both personally and professionally in Germany for
more than fifteen years, argued that the Law on the abolition of
nobility hampered her rights to free movement. By contrast, the
Austrian Government stressed the importance of the Law on the
abolition of nobility which, as a matter of public policy, "went
hand in hand with the creation of the Republic of Austria."Yb
Hence, the referring court asked, in essence, whether Article 21
94. Omega, [2004] E.C.R. I-9609, 1 37.
95. TRIDIMAS supra note 23. at 341.
96. Sayn-Wittgenstein, [2010] E.C.R. I-13693, [ 32.
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TFEU may authorize a Member State to rely on reasons of a
constitutional nature in order not to recognize all the elements
of a name obtained by one of its nationals in another Member
State. The ECJ began by finding that the refusal by Austrian
authorities to recognize the noble elements of Ms SaynWittgenstein's surname constituted a restriction on her rights to
free movement. Such refusal may cause Ms Sayn-Wittgenstein
"'serious inconvenience' within the meaning of Grunkin and
Paul[9 7] result[ing] from having to alter all the traces of a formal
nature of the name 'Firstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein' left in both
the public and the private spheres, given that her official
identity documents currently refer to her by a different name."98
Indeed, the discrepancy in names may dispel doubts as to Ms
Sayn-Wittgenstein's identity and the authenticity of the
documents she submits, or the veracity of their content." As to
the justification, the ECJ held that, as a matter of public policy, a
Member State may restrict the right to free movement in order
to protect an element of its national identity.0 o Although public
policy had to be interpreted strictly, the ECJ noted that, since
"the concept of public policy may vary from one Member State
to another and from one era to another [,] [t]he competent
national authorities must therefore be allowed a margin of
discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty."o'0 Next, the
ECJ recognized as legitimate the objective pursued by the Law
on the abolition of the nobility, which "seeks to ensure the
observance of the principle of equal treatment as a general
principle of law",102 enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter. As to
the principle of proportionality, the ECJ recalled its findings in
Omega:
[I] t is not indispensable for the restrictive measure issued by
the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a
conception shared by all Member States as regards the
precise way in which the fundamental right or legitimate

interest in question is to be protected and that, on the

97. Grunkin-Paul v. Standesaint Niebil. Case C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7639.
98. Sayn-Wittgenstein, [2010] E.C.R. I-13693, 1[ 67.
99. Id. 1 69.
100. Id.
83-84.
101. Id. 1[ 87.
102. Id. 1 89.
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contrary, the need for, and proportionality of, the
provisions adopted are not excluded merely because one
Member State has chosen a system of protection different
from that adopted by another State.os
Hence, the ECJ ruled that the refusal by Austrian
authorities to recognize the noble elements of the surname of a
national of that State was compatible with Article 21 TFEU.
Moreover, in order to strengthen its approach, the ECJ
referred for the first time, though in passing, to Article 4(2)
TEU, according to which "the [EU] is to respect the national
identities of its Member States, which include the status of the
State as a Republic." 04 This is an important development which
suggests that Article 4(2) TEU is to be interpreted as protecting
"national
identity"
understood
as
the
fundamental
constitutional principles of the Member States. However, the
fact that the ECJ mentioned Article 4(2) TEU in the context of
the principle of proportionality implies that "national identity"
is not absolute, but must be weighted against the fundamental
values of the EU.1os This means that where fundamental
constitutional values of the Member States are at stake but no
core value of the Union is in danger, then "value diversity" will
prevail over uniform application of EU law. Conversely, where
the national measure at issue threatens values of essential
importance to the very existence of the Union (such as the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality), the
Member State concerned will not be able to rely on Article 4(2)
TEU. The approach followed by the ECJ in Omega and SaynWittgenstein is fully consistent with this reading of Article 4(2)
TEU. Where the contested national measure has nothing to do
with protectionism,i' i.e. where no core value of the Union is at
103. Id. 1[ 91.
104. Id. [ 92.
105. See Aimin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy:
Respect for NationalIdentity Under the Lisbon Treat,. 48 COMMOIN MKT. L. RL. 1417, 1420
does not enjoy absolute protection
(2011) (arguing that "[n]ational identity [
under EU law, but has to be balanced, against the principle of uniform application of
EU law; implementing this duty is a task for both the E(J and national constitutional
courts as parts of a system of composite constitutional adjudication").
106. Cf Intl Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP (Viking)", Case
C-438/05. [2007] E.C.R. I-10779. In relation to that case, I have argued that trade
unions sought protectonist measures by struggling to keep jobs at home. While it is in
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stake, by applying a proportionality test which leaves to the
Member States the level at which constitutional principles of
fundamental importance are to be protected, the ECJ seeks to
respect "value diversity."
ii. The Importance of Consistency
The way in which the ECJ applied the principle of
proportionality in Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein is not limited to
national measures protecting fundamental constitutional
principles. The ECJ has equally favored "value diversity" where a
national measure pursues a legitimate objective in relation to
which EU law does not require Member States to adopt the same
level of protection. For instance, this is the case where, in the
absence of EU harmonization, non-discriminatory national
measures constituting obstacles to free movement aim to protect
public health or public morality. Needless to say, this approach
does not apply where the core values of the Union are put at
risk.
However, the fact that the ECJ recognizes considerable
leeway to the Member States when they establish the level at
which national interests are protected, does not exclude that it
will examine the consistency of the national legislation as a
whole aiming to protect that interest. As the ECJ held in
Placanica:0 7
[W]ith regard to the [objective of reducing gambling
opportunities], it is clear from the case-law that although
restrictions on the number of operators are in principle
capable of being justified, those restrictions must in any
event reflect a concern to bring about a genuine diminution

principle legitimate for trade unions to seek to protect workers from social dumping, it
is equally true that trade unions are not entitled to shield local labor markets from
competition coming from Member States with low average wages. For this reason, the
E(

J may

have felt that granting a margin of appreciation to trade unions in such a

broad way, as if they were Member State authorities, was inappropriate. Otherwise, the
E(,J might have tilted the balance in favor of a "social Europe" that arguably excludes a
large part of its new citizens. Trade unions could easily engage in social protectionism,
leading to retaliatory measures and eventually to the fragmentation of social groups
across Europe. See Lenacrts & Gutidrrez-Fons, supra note 16, at 1666.
107. Criminal Proceedings Against Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese &

Angelo SorricchioJoined Cases C-338/04, C-359-60/04, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891.
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of gambling opportunities and to limit activities in that
sector in a consistent and systematic manner. 08
After Placanica, the ECJ has continuously stressed the
importance of consistency of the national rules on gambling in
order to secure their compatibility with the Treaty provisions on
free movement. Though Member States enjoy a wide margin of
discretion in deciding the level of protection at which they wish
to ban behavior of dubious morality such as gambling, 0 the ECJ
is committed to verifying that those national rules are free from
internal and external contradictions. 110 The contested national
rules often set up a public monopoly or restrict market access
for private operators so as to fight crime and/or prevent
individuals from becoming addicted to gambling. However, the
ECJ engages in a joint reading of the national rules at issue and
the national legislation as a whole. If that reading shows
inconsistencies revealing that the objective of combating crime
and/or game addiction is illusory, whilst the national
legislation's true purpose appears to be to increase public
revenue, the contested national rule will not bejustified.I
The ECJ went on testing the consistency of the justifications
put forward by the Member States in other areas of the law, such
as the provision of healthcare services.112 For example, in
Hartlaue1," the ECJ examined the compatibility of the Austrian
system of prior authorization for the setting up and operation of
outpatient dental clinics with EU law. In order to better
108. Id. [ 53.
109. See Liga Portuguesa de Futebol v. Departanento de Jogos da Santa Casa da
Misericordia de Lisboa, Case C-42/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, 1 57 (holding that "the
legislation on games of chance is one of the areas in which there are significant moral,
religious and cultural differences bctween the Member States. In the absence of [EU]
harmonisation in the field, it is for each Member State to determine in those areas, in
accordance with its own scale of values, what is required in order to ensure that the
intcrcsts in question are protected").

I 10. See Stefaan Van den Bogaert & Armin Cuyvers, "Woney for Nothing": The Case
Law of the EU Court of fustice on the Regulation of Gambling, 48 COMMON MKT L. REV.
1175, 1193 (2011).
Ill. See, e.g., joined Cases C-316/07, C-358-60/07, C-409-10/07, [2010] E.C.R. I8069. 1 106: see also Carnen Media Group Ltd. v. Land Schleswig-Holstein. Case C46/08. [2010] E.C.R. 1-8149, 1 68.
112. See, e.g., Corporaci6n Dermoesttica SA v. To Me Group Advertising Media
Srl, Case C-500/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-5785.
113. Hartlaucr Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landesregicrung, Case
C-169/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-1721, 1 55.
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understand the case, it is worth pointing out that the Austrian
social security system is mixed. On the one hand, it is based on a
system of benefits in kind when healthcare services are provided
by establishments belonging to the social security institutions or
by establishments or independent practitioners contracted to
sickness funds ("contractual practitioners").'1 4 On the other
hand, if an insured patient wishes to hire the services of a noncontractual practitioner, he or she has a right to reimbursement
by the social security system up to a ceiling of eighty percent of
the sum that would have been charged by a contractual
practitioner. "5 Austrian legislation conditioned the setting up
and operation of non-contractual outpatient dental clinics upon
obtaining a prior authorization which could not be granted if
demand for dental services within a given province was already
satisfied by the existing dental service providers. Hartlauer, a
German company, which had unsuccessfully applied for a
license to open an outpatient dental clinic in Vienna,
challenged that negative decision before the Austrian courts. It
alleged that the Austrian legislation was contrary to the freedom
of establishment. However, in recalling the case-law of the ECJ
regarding patient mobility and hospital care,11 Austria argued
that, even if there was a restriction of the freedom of
establishment, it could be justified on the ground that there was
a general interest in planning the number of outpatient dental
clinics so as to avoid wastage of financial, technical and human
resources, whilst ensuring a sufficient and permanent access to a
high-quality dental treatment. Accordingly, in order to preserve
healthcare planning, the system of prior authorization was
necessary. In addition, an open access to non-contractual
practitioners would drive contractual practitioners to disappear
from the market, since the former would focus on the profitable
part of the market, rendering sickness funds incapable of
covering their costs ("cream-skimming").

114. Id. 1[ 16. See also Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Hartlauer.[2009] E.C.R. I1721. 1[ 30-32.
115 Hartla[u, 2009] E.C.R. 1-1721, 1 17.
116. See, e.g., Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Case C-372/04, [2006] E.C.R.
1-4325; V.G. Muller-Faur6 v. Onderlinge Waarborginaatschappi OZ Zorgverzekeringen
UA, Case C-385/99, [2003] E.C.R. I-4509.
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Although the ECJ recognized the objective pursued by
Austria as legitimate,11 it noted that no authorization was
required for "group practices" which, unlike outpatient dental
clinics, take the legal form of a for-profit partnership comprising
partners with an independent entitlement to practice and who
are personally liable."
But given that "the premises and
equipment of group practices and those of outpatient dental
clinics may have comparable features and that in many cases the
patient will not notice any difference between them" and that
"group practices generally offer the same medical services as
outpatient dental clinics and are subject to the same market
conditions", '9 the ECJ found that the contested Austrian
legislation contained a clear inconsistency: group practices
could also upset the organization and planning of the provision
of care in an area.120
More recently, the ruling of the ECJ in Blanco Pirez'l2
provides a good example which shows how the ECJ combines a
soft application of the proportionality test with the requirement
of consistency. In that case, the ECJ examined the compatibility
of Asturian legislation (Spain) which conditioned the opening
of new pharmacies upon obtaining a prior authorization, the
award of which had to comply with geographical and
demographical limits.2 Those limits were as follows:
- [I]n each pharmaceutical area, a single pharmacy may
be opened, as a general rule, per unit of 2 800 inhabitants
[(the '2800 inhabitants' rule)];
117. Hartlauer,[2009] E.C.R. 1-1721, 1 52.
118. Id. [59.
119. Id. 1157-58.
120. Id. 1[ 60.
121. Blanco Perez & Chao Gomez v. Consejerfa de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios,
Joined Cases C-570-71/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-4629.
122. In addition, the E( J also examined the selection criteria for licensees for new
pharmacies which, in essence, gave preference to pharmacists with professional
experience obtained within the Autonomous Community of Asturias. The E( J found
those criteria to be discriminatory and that they could not be justified by the need to
maintain a level of quality in the pharmaceutical service, given that pharmacists falling
within the scope of Council Directive 85/432/EEC Concerning the Mutual
Recognition of Diplomas, Certificates. and Other Evidence of Formal Qualifications in
Pharmacy, 1985 0.]. L 353/34-and Directive 2005/36/EC of the European
Parliament and ofthe Council on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications, 2005
OJ. L 25/ 22
C-were
decied to be sufficiently qualified to provide services of a high
quality. BlancoPrez, [2010] E.C.R. 1-4629, 1 15.
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- a supplementary pharmacy may not be opened until
that threshold has been exceeded, that pharmacy being
established for the fraction above 2 000 inhabitants; and
- each pharmacy must be a minimum distance away
from existing pharmacies, that distance being, as a general
rule, 250 metres' [(the "250 metres" rule) ].123
Hence, the contested national measure limited the number
of pharmaceutical service providers according to economic and
social needs. Although the contested national measure was
applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality,'2
the ECJ found that it was liable to hinder or render less
attractive the exercise by EU nationals of the freedom of
establishment, since a system of prior authorization caused
undertakings to bear additional administrative and financial
costs, and prevented the undertakings not satisfying the
predetermined requirements from carrying out a self-employed
pharmaceutical activity.125
Next, the ECJ held that the contested measure could be
justified on grounds of public health, given that it sought to
distribute the number of pharmacies within a given
geographical area evenly, so as to ensure adequate access to
pharmaceutical services as well as to improve the reliability and
the quality of the provision of medical products to the public.126
As to the principle of proportionality, the ECJ first recalled
that "it is for the Member States to determine the level of
protection which they wish to afford to public health and the
way in which that level is to be achieved. Since the level may vary
from one Member State to another, Member States should be
allowed [a margin] of discretion."1 27 Accordingly, as the ECJ
held in Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein, "the fact that one Member
State imposes more stringent rules than another in relation to
the protection of public health does not mean that those rules
are incompatible with the Treaty provisions on the fundamental
freedoms."1 28 Second, the ECJ examined whether the contested
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Blanco Prez. [2010] E.C.R. I-4629, 1[ 52.
Id. 1[ 62.
id.154.
Id. 1[ 78.
Id. 1[ 44.

Id.

1 68.
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legislation was appropriate to the aim pursued. It noted that the
"2800 inhabitants" rule was capable of preventing both a surplus
of pharmacies in densely populated areas which might be
perceived as very profitable, and a deficit of pharmacies in
geographically isolated or disadvantaged areas.'
The ECJ
further observed that the "2800 inhabitants" rule may not be
sufficient to ensure adequate access to pharmaceutical services.
Indeed, such demographical limit does not prevent the
establishment of a high concentration of pharmacies within one
and the same pharmaceutical area, generating a duplication of
structures in some parts of that area, whilst other parts of the
same area might suffer from a lack of pharmacies. That is why
the ECJ also upheld the "250 metres" rule. In addition, in
1 o it ruled that:
referring to its previous ruling in Hartltuer,,
[I] t is also essential that the way in which that legislation
pursues that objective is not inconsistent. According to the
case-law of the [ECJ], the various rules - and the national
legislation as a whole - are appropriate for ensuring
attainment of the objective relied upon only if they
genuinely reflect a concern to attain that objective in a
consistent and systematic manner. 3
For the case at hand, this meant that the "2800 inhabitants"
rule and the "250 meters" rule contained in the contested
legislation had to be readjusted so as to take into account areas
with special geographical and demographical features. For
example, for rural, mountainous or tourist areas, the limit of
2800 inhabitants per pharmacy could be inappropriate to
ensure adequate access to pharmaceutical services. Likewise, in
densely populated areas, a minimum distance of 250 meters per
pharmacy could bring about a shortage in the supply of
pharmaceutical senices.13 2 Accordingly, the ECJ held that it was
for the referring court to ascertain whether those two basic rules
could be adapted in accordance with the special features of
certain pharmaceutical areas. Finally, after stressing again that
the Member States enjoy a broad margin of discretion in
129.
130.
C-169/07,
131.
132.

Id. 1 72.
See Hartlaucr Hiiandelsgescllschaft inbH v. Wiener Landesregicrung, Case
[2009] E.C.R. 1-1721.
Blanco Perez, [2010] E.C.R. 1-4629, 1 94.
Blanco Perez, [2010] E.C.R. 1-4629, It 99-102.
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relation to the protection of public health, the ECJ rejected that
the contested measure went beyond what was necessary to attain

the aim pursued.'
Cases like Placanica, Hartlauer and Blanco Pirez show that
the ECJ endeavors to find the true purpose underpinning the
national measure in question. In so doing, it focuses on the
contextual aspects of the proportionality principle. In other
words, the principle of proportionality is not applied in an
abstract fashion, "but as a part of the legal and factual context in
which the [contested] measure operates."'1 4 In order to ensure
that there is no protectionist objective behind the contested
national measure, judicial deference in relation to the
"necessity" prong of the principle of proportionality is
compensated by incorporating the "consistency" test into the
"suitability" prong of the same principle. In so doing, the ECJ
enhances the legitimacy of its legal reasoning: verifying the
absence of contradictions in the justifications put forward by the
Member States is a strong way for the ECJ to dismiss arbitrary
criteria when assessing the compatibility of national measures
with EU law.

133. In so doing, it found that the Mcinber State concerned was entitled to
consider that a "minimum number" system was less effective than the scheme set out by
thc contcsted lkgislation. According to that alternative sys te, a "no licence for Setting
up a new pharmacy would be issued [...] in areas where theire was alrcady an adequate
number of pharmacies, until each of the specific geographical zones had the minimum
number of pharmacies required. However. as soon as each of those areas had the
minimum number of pharmacies, the opening of new pharmacies would be possible."
Id. 1 105. Indeed, given that Spain had decided to transfer to the Autonomous
Cominunities the organization of the distribution of pharmacies and that it was a
national objective to channel pharnacists towards areas where there were no
pharmacies, in whatever region, the FC] observed that the "minimum number" system
could actually hinder that objective: "it is possible[, the ECJ reasoned.] that thc
pharmacists concerned would tend to swell the numbers of pharimacists in regions
where the minimum number has already been reached - and where, as a consequence,
thire are no restrictions on the opening of pharmacies - instead of setting up in areas
where there are no pharmacies. in the regions where the minimum number has not
been reached." Id. I 111.
134. Gjermund Mathisen, Consistency and Coherence as Conditions forJustification of
Member State Measures Restricting Free Movement 47 COMMON MKT. L. RV. 1021, 1040
(2010).
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2. In the Presence of EU harmonization
In the presence of EU harmonizing measures, it is not
sufficient for national law to comply with primary EU law.
Additionally, Member States must comply with the way in which
the EU legislator has struck the balance between the substantive
law of the Union and national interests. The normative yardstick
determining the compatibility of national law with EU law is
then also constituted by secondary EU law. It follows that the
margin of manoeuvre enjoyed by national authorities, if any, is
limited by the legislative framework put in place by the EU
legislator. This does not mean, however, that, within that
framework, the ECJ will never be in a position to accommodate
national interests. The recent ruling of the ECJ in Mesopotamia
Broadcastillustrates this point.1 ,'5
Before explaining the facts of the case, an overview must be
given of the way in which the EU legislator has sought to remove
obstacles to the freedom to provide broadcasting services within
the EU. Directive 89/5521 6 (as amended by Directive 97/3613)
encapsulates "the principle of the originating Member State"
whereby "it is necessary and sufficient that all broadcasts comply
with the law of the Member State from which they emanate."'
It is for the authorities of that Member State to check whether
television broadcasts emanating therein comply with the rules
on broadcasting thereof. In accordance with Article 2a of
Directive 89/552, only exceptionally and provisionally may the
receiving Member State suspend the retransmission of a
televised broadcast emanating from other Member States, in so
far as such a broadcast is in breach of Articles 22(1) or (2)
and/or Article 22a of that Directive. The latter provision states

135. Mesopotamia Broadcasting and Roj TV A/S v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
(delivered September 22, 2011) (not yet
Joined Cases C-244-45/10, [2011] E.C.R. I
reported).
136. Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the Coordination of Certain Provisions
Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning
the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 0.] L 298/23
137. Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the
pursuit of television broadcasting activities, 1997 O.J. L 202/60.
138. Opinion of Advocate General BoL in Mesopotamia Broadcasting. [2011] E.C.R.
1-_ (delivered Sept. 22, 2011) (not yet reported).
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that "Member States shall ensure that broadcasts do not contain
any incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or
nationality." Moreover, Article 2a of Directive 89/552 lays down
additional requirements for suspension.'" It follows that, in
areas coordinated by Directive 89/552, the receiving Member
State may only suspend a broadcast in compliance with Article
2a.
Mesopotamia Broadcast is a holding company incorporated
under Danish law which owns several Danish broadcasting
licenses and operates, inter alia, the broadcaster Roj TN. Roj
TV's programmes are produced mainly in Kurdish and
broadcasted via satellite throughout Europe and the Middle
East. In 2006 and 2007, convinced that Roj TV supported the
objectives of the PKK, which the EU has classified as a "terrorist"
organization, Turkey lodged a complaint with the Danish
Television Committee. However, those complaints were
dismissed on the ground that Roj TV had violated neither
Article 22 nor Article 22a of Directive 89/552. In 2008, the
German Federal Ministry of Interior took a different view,
prohibiting Mesopotamia Broadcast from carrying out, through
the agency of Roj TV, any activities falling within the scope of
the German law governing associations (the "Vereinsgesetz"). It
also precluded Roj TV from undertaking its activities in
Germany. Its decision was based on the fact that Roj TV
supported the use of violence to achieve the political aims of the
139. See Directive 89/552, supra note 136, Article 2a, which provides: " .
]
from paragraph 1 if the following
conditions are fulilled: (a) a television broadcast coming from another Member State
manifestly, seriously and gravely infringes Artice 22(1) or (2) and/or Artice 22a;
2. Member States may, provisionally, derogate

(b) during the previous 12 months, the broadcaster has infringed the provision(s)

referred to in (a) on at least two prior occasions; (c) the Member State concerned has
notified the broadcaster and the Commission in writing of the alleged infringements
and of the measures it intends to take should any such infringement occur again; (d)
consultations with the transmitting Member State and the Commission have not
produced an amicable settencnt within 15 days of the notification provided for in (c),
and the alleged infringement persists.
The Commission shall, within two months following notification of the measures
taken by the Member State, take a decision on whether the measures are compatible
with Community law. If it decides that they arc not, the Member State will be required
to put an end to the measures in question as a matter of urgency.
3. Paragraph 2 shall be without prejudice to the application of any procedure,
remedy or sanction to the infringements in question in the Member State which has

jurisdiction over the broadcaster concerned."
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PKK and in relations between Turks and Kurds, thus infringing
the constitutional "principles of international understanding"
for the purposes of the Vereinsgesetz. Mesopotamia Broadcast
and Roj TV challenged that decision before the competent
German court. They argued that the decision of the German
authorities was in breach of Directive 89/522 as it was for Danish
authorities alone to exercise control over their broadcasting
activities. Moreover, they posited that the German decision was
in breach of Article 2a of that Directive. Conversely, the German
Federal Government argued that Directive 89/552 did not
prevent Member States from applying their general rules on
criminal or police matters or the Vereinsgesetz, even if those
rules were capable of adversely affecting television broadcasting
activities.
At the outset, the ECJ stressed that Directive 89/552 has a
non-exhaustive character, and accordingly, "with regard to areas
relating to public order, public morality or public security [ ...
a Member State is free to apply to the activities carried out by
broadcasters on its territory generally applicable rules
concerning those fields, in so far as those rules do not hinder
retransmission." 14 Next, it examined whether the activities
carried out by Roj TV fell within the meaning of "any incitement
to hatred" as provided for by Article 22a of Directive 89/552.
The ECJ replied in the affirmative. In light of the literal,
systematic and teleological interpretation of Article 22a, it
defined "incitement to hatred" as a concept "designed to
forestall any ideology which fails to respect human values, in
particular initiatives which attempt to justify violence by terrorist
acts against a particular group of persons."' 4 ' Hence, since the
activities of Roj TV stirred up the violence between Turks and
Kurds in Turkey and intensified the tensions between those two
groups in Germany, that behaviour was covered by the concept
of "incitement to hatred." This meant that German authorities
were precluded from hindering Roj TV's retransmissions, unless
they did so in accordance with Article 2a of Directive 89/552.
The fact that the risk of confrontation between those two groups

140. Mesopotamia Broadcasting [2011] E.C.R. I
141. Id. [42.

(delivered Sept. 22, 2011), 1 37.
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was more likely in Germany than in Denmark was of no
relevance. 42

However, referring to its previous ruling in De Agostini,143
the ECJ recalled that a distinction had to be drawn between, on
the one hand, national measures which constitute an obstacle to
retransmission per se and, on the other hand, national measures
with the general aim of protecting public policy. Whilst the
former type of measure must comply with Article 2a of Directive
89/552, the latter type falls outside the scope of coordination of
that Directive and must only comply with primary EU law. This
meant for the case at hand that Directive 89/552 did not
prohibit Germany from adopting a measure which "pursue [d] a
public
policy objective
without
however
preventing
retransmission per se, on its territory, of television broadcasts
from another Member State." 44 Hence, Germany could, for
example, prohibit Roj TV from producing broadcasts and
organizing public events within its territory. The ECJ deferred to
the national court the determination of the type of activities
which were contrary to the principles of international
understanding as provided for by the Vereinsgesetz but did not
prevent the retransmission per se in Germany of Roj TV's
broadcasts.
Mesopotamia Broadcast is a positive development which
confirms that, in interpreting EU harmonizing measures, the
ECJ takes national interests seriously. Thus, the fact that the EU
legislator has harmonized an area of law does not automatically
rule out that national interests may be taken into account. On
the contrary, Mesopotamia Broadcast shows that the ECJ seeks to
strike the balance intended by EU law taken as a whole, between
the objectives pursued by the EU legislator and the interests of
the Member States. On the one hand, the ECJ ruled that
Germany was precluded from exercising a double control on the
broadcasting activities of Roj TV. The exercise of such control
would run counter to the principle of the originating Member
142. Id. 1[ 45.
143. Koisuicntenoinbudsinannen v. De Agostini (Svenska) Flrlag AB and TV-

shop i Sverige AB, joined Cases C-34-36/95, [1997] FC.R. 1-3843 (noting in that case
that the national mleasures at issue sought to protect consumers froin misleading
advertising).
I44. Mesopotamia Broadcasting, [2011 ] E.C.R. I_
(delivered Sept. 22, 2011) 1[50.
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State. This meant that German authorities had either to trust
the decision adopted by their Danish counterparts or to follow
the procedure laid down in Directive 89/552 in order to oppose
that decision. On the other hand, the ECJ stressed that Directive
89/552 could not be interpreted so as to deprive the receiving
Member State, namely Germany, of its police powers. Germany
could control the activities of Roj TV which took place within its
territory. For example, a public event organized by Roj TV could
be banned, even if that implied that such event could no longer
be broadcasted.
III. INTERNAL LEGITIMACY
So far, the present contribution has primarily focused on
examining whether the ECJ is committed to standing behind the
line that divides "law" from "politics", i.e. it has focused on the
external aspects ofjudicial legitimacy. By contrast, Part III of this
contribution aims to determine whether the judicial function in
the EU legal order is exercised in a way that guarantees a highquality judicial process. To this end, Section A examines
whether the ECJ is committed to respecting the allocation of
judicial powers provided for by Article 267 TFEU. Section B
then looks into the question whether the ECJ operates as a
"rational actor" ensuring that the outcome it reaches is based on
convincing grounds. It thus assesses the persuasiveness of the
ECJ's legal reasoning.
A. The ECJ and National Courts
One of the key elements explaining the success of
European integration lies in that, from the very beginning, the
ECJ brought national courts on board. The relationship between
the ECJ and national courts has been portrayed as a
"dialogue." 145 This means that, though there are some
hierarchical elements in that relationship,1 4 6 mutual cooperation
and empowerment is at its centre. The principles of direct effect
145. See Opinion of the ECJ, 1/09, [2011] E.C.R. 1-1137. 1 84.
I 46. See. e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogae and Decree: Iternational Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004); Jan Kominrek, Federal Elements in the
Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in the Connunity Legal Order, 42 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 9 (2005).
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and primacy in conjunction with the preliminary reference
procedure gave to national courts a leading role in the legal
construction of Europe.14 7 Those two constitutional principles
and Article 267 TFEU somehow shifted powers from the
national legislature and executive to the national judiciary as
well as from higher courts to lower courts.'14 The lowest court of
the national judicial pyramid may indeed have to set aside
national law breaching EU law, even if that implies departing
from the case-law of the supreme or constitutional court.1 49
Additionally, the relationship between the ECJ and national
courts may be assessed in terms of allocation of powers. Unlike
other federal systems, the EU rests on an integrated judiciary,15o
in which judicial power as to the enforcement of EU law is
shared between EU and national courts.1 1 First, regarding
judicial review of EU measures, EU courts enjoy the monopoly
to declare secondary EU law invalid.'" Accordingly, in order to
ensure compliance with the rule of law, access to these courts
must be guaranteed. Where private applicants do not enjoy
direct access to EU courts, the ECJ has held, and now the Treaty
itself suggestsj" that national rules of procedure must provide
indirect means of challenging those measures. 154 Second, under
147. See Opinion of the ECJ 1/09. [2011] E.C.R. 1-1137. 1 66 (holding that" [a]s is
evident from Article 19(1) TEU, the guardians of that legal order and the judicial
system of the European Union are the [ECJI] and the courts and tribunals of the
Member States").
148. See Takis Tridimas, The European Court ofJustice and the Draft Constitution: A
Supreme Court of the Union ? in EUROPEAN LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
RETHINKING THE NEw LEGAL ORDER 114 (Tridinas et al. eds., 2004).

149. See. e.g., Kizysztor Filipiak v. Director Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu, Case
C-314/08. [2009] E.C.R. I-11049. 1 84; see also Winner WettCn GmbH v.
Btiigermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, Case C-409/06, [2010] E.C.R. I-8015. 1 60.
150. See Daniel Halberstan, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POTATICS 142 (Whittington et al. eds., 2008).

151. See Opinion of the ECJ, 1/09 [2011] E.C.R. 1-1137. 1 69.
152. See. e.g., Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollant Libeck-Ost, Case 314/85, [1987] E.CR.
4199; Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV v. van Landbouw, Case C-461/03. [2005]
E.C.R. I-10.513.
153. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. [19], 2012
O.J. C 326/1, at 27 ("Mcnber States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure
effective legal protection in the fieds covered by Union law"); see also Koen Lenacrts,
Le traite de Lisbonne et la protection juridictionlle d particulier e droit de l'Union,
CAHI-RS DL DROLL EUJROPLEN 711 (2009).

154. See generally Kcn Lenacrts, The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial
System of theEuropean Union, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1625 (2007).
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the preliminary reference procedure, the ECJ has only
jurisdiction to interpret EU law, not national law,5 So that it
may not declare a national measure to be incompatible with EU
law.' @
The interpretation of EU law is indeed a task for the ECJ
to undertake, whereas its application to the case at hand is for
the national courts alone to carry out.'' 7
Just as happens with national law, it is often difficult, if not
impossible, to draw the dividing line between interpretation and
application of EU law. Sometimes the ECJ will provide a ruling
of general application,15 whilst in others the answer will be
adapted to the specific circumstance "at issue in the case in the
main proceedings." 1 5s This flexibility is of paramount
importance for the proper functioning of the preliminary
reference procedure. It allows the ECJ to accommodate its
answers to different factors. First, the degree of precision with
which the referring court sets out the facts of the case and
interprets the relevant parts of national law, determines the
generality or specificity of the answer provided by the ECJ.
When the order for reference is very precisely drafted there is a
155. See, e.g., Demag v. Finanzamt Duisburg-Sud, Case 27/74. [1974] E.C.R. 1037,
8; see also Freistaat Bayern v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, Case C-347/89, [1991] E.C.R. I1747. 1[ 16; Turn- und Sportunion Waldburg v. Finanzlandesdircktion fiir
Oberisterreich, Case C-246/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-589, 1 20; dos Santos Palhota & Others,
Case C-515/08, [2010] E.C.R. 1-9133, [ 18 (holding that "Article 267 TFEU is based on
a dcear separation of functions between national courts and tribunals and the ... [ECJ],
and the latter is empowered to rule only on the interpretation or the validity of the acts
of the European Union referred to in that article. In that context, it is not for the . .
[E( J] to rule on the interpretation of national laws or regulations or to decide
whether the referring court's interpretation of them is correct").
156. This is different under Articles 258 to 260 of the Lisbon Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.
157. See, e.g., Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v.
Feryn NV (Feryn), Case C-54/07, [2008] E.C.R. 1-5187,
19 (holding that Article 267
TFEU "does not cmpower the ... [E( J] to apply rules of ... [EU] law to a particular
case, but only to rule on the interpretation of the EC Treat[ies] and of acts adopted by
... [EU] institutions").
158. See, e.g., Audiolux & Others v. Groupe Biuxctie

Lamlbrt SA

(GBL) &

Others, Case C-101/08 [2009]. E.C.R. 1-9823 1 64 (holding that "EU "law does not
include any general principle of law under which minority shareholders are protected
by an obligation on the dominant shareholder, when acquiring or exercising control of
a company, to offer to buy their shares under the same conditions as those agreed
when a shareholding conferring or strengthening the control of the dominant
shareholder was acquired").
159. Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE
(OPAP), Case C-444/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-10,549, 1 36.
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bigger chance of the ECJ giving a tailor-made answer as to the
EU law implications of the case. Second, where the ECJ has
already rendered several rulings in a given area of EU law so that
the questions referred to it are neither of great complexity nor
raise novel issues, it may limit itself to recalling previous caselaw. This should be seen as a sign of maturity of the EU legal
order whereby the ECJ trusts national courts as to the daily
application of EU law. Third, in matters which raise national
sensitivities, the ECJ will opt for answering the questions
referred to it in such a way as to take into account the concerns
put forward by the Member States.16o Last, but not least, in some
cases, the ECJ simply provides the EU law framework within
which the referring court must take its decision. This is done in
cases involving questions of fact or national law that still have to
be determined by the referring court. The ECJ then clarifies the
several possible ways under EU law to go about the case, leaving
it to the national court to select the correct one after assessing
the facts and aspects of national law. The ruling of the ECJ in
Bressol and its implementation by the Belgian Constitutional
Court provide an excellent illustration in this regard.
In Bressol,'"' the ECJ was asked by the Belgian Constitutional
Court to examine the compatibility of the decree of the French
Community ("the 2006 decree")--which regulated the number
of students in certain programmes in the first two years of
undergraduate studies in higher education-with the Treaty
provisions on EU citizenship. The system of higher education of
the French Community is based on free access to education, i.e.
there are no entry exams. However, in recent years, French
students, who had failed to pass the entry exams in France, have
gone to study at the Universities of the French Community. The
number of students having become too large, in particular in
medical and paramedical courses, the authorities of the French
Community thought that, having regard to the budgetary,
human and material resources available to the teaching
institutions concerned, such an influx of students was
jeopardizing the quality of teaching-and, because of the nature

1

160. See, e.&, Gueye & Others, joined Cases C-483/09 &
(delivered Sept. 15. 2011) (not yet reported).

-I/ 10, [2011] E.C.R.

161. Bressol & Others v. Gouvernentin de la Communaute Francaise, Case C-

73/08, [2010] E.C.R. 1-2735, [ 2.
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of the programmes at issue, public health. Accordingly, in
relation to nine medical or paramedical programmes,1 26 the
French Community adopted the 2006 decree which provided a
numerus clausus for enrollment by non-resident students who
were selected by the drawing of lots, whilst resident students
continued to enjoy free access to the courses referred thereto.
In order to qualify as a resident student, a double condition had
to be fulfilled. "Essentially, 'residents' [were] persons who both
[had] their principal residence in Belgium and [had] a right of
permanent residence in Belgium."6 3 Moreover, the number of
non-resident students in those courses could not exceed a thirty
percent threshold. Mr. Bressol and other students, most of them
French nationals, brought an action before the Belgian
Constitutional Court contesting the constitutionality of the 2006
decree. They posited that that decree violated the principle of
equality by treating resident and non-resident students
differently, for no valid reason.
At the outset, the ECJ stressed that EU law does not detract
from the Member States the power to organize their education
systems and vocational training. A Member State is free to opt
for a system based on free access or for a system which lays down
a numerus clausus of students. However, in so doing, it must
comply with EU law, in particular with the Treaty provisions on
EU citizenship.1 64 Next, the ECJ found that the 2006 decree put
non-resident students at a disadvantage vis-i-vis resident
students, since only the latter continued to enjoy free access to
any of the nine medical or paramedical courses referred to.
Since the condition of residence was more easily met by Belgians
than by students of other nationalities, the 2006 decree created
a difference in treatment indirectly based on nationality that
needed to bejustified.65

162. Those nine programmes were: Bachelor in physiotherapy and rehabilitation;
Bachelor in veterinary inedicine; Bachelor of midwifery; Bachelor of occupational
therapy; Bachelor of speech therapy; Bachelor of podiatry-chiropody; Bachelor of
physiotherapy; Bachelor of audiology; Educator specialized in psycho-educational
counseling.

2735.

163. Opinion of Advocate, General Sharpston in Bressol & Others, [2010] E.C.R. I1 25.
164. Bressol & Others. [2010] E.C.R. 1-2735, 1 28-29.
165. Id. 146-47.
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As to the justification of the 2006 decree, the Belgian
Government argued that it sought to counter the excessive
burdens on the financing of higher education brought about by
non-resident students. However, observing that the financing of
higher education did not depend on the total number of
students but was based on a system of a "closed envelope", the
ECJ dismissed that j ustification.166
In addition, the Belgian Government posited that the 2006
decree aimed to ensure the quality and continuing provision of
medical and paramedical care within the French Community. It
argued that the large numbers of non-resident students were
likely ultimately to reduce the quality of teaching in medical and
paramedical courses which require a significant amount of
hours of practical training. In the same way, those large
numbers may also bring about a shortage of qualified medical
personnel throughout the territory which would undermine the
system of public health within the French Community, given
that after completing their studies, non-resident graduates tend
to return to their country of origin to exercise their profession
there, whilst the number of resident graduates remains too low
in some specialties.1 67 The ECJ recognized as legitimate the
public health concerns raised by the Belgian Government.
However, it provided a detailed framework of analysis that the
referring court had to follow in order to determine whether
there were genuine risks to the protection of public health and
thus, whether the 2006 decree complied with EU law.
First, in assessing those risks, the referring court had to take
into consideration "the fact that the link between the training of
future health professionals and the objective of maintaining a
balanced high-quality medical service open to all is only indirect
and the causal relationship less well established than in the case
of the link between the objective of public health and the
activity of health professionals who are already present on the
market."'16 Second, the ECJ pointed out that, whilst the Member
State concerned does not have to wait for the risks to the
protection of public health to materialize, it must, however,
show that those risks actually exist. Third, the ECJ held that, for
166. Id. 550.
167. Id. 59.
168. Id. [ 69.
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each of the nine courses covered by the 2006 decree, the
analysis undertaken by the referring court had to determine the
maximum number of students who can be trained at a level
which complies with the desired training quality standards, as
well as the number of graduates which is necessary to ensure
adequate public health services. In determining those numbers,
the analysis may not focus on one or the other group of students
but it must take into account the number of non-resident
students who decide to practice in Belgium, the number of
resident students who decide to work in a Member State other
than Belgium, and the number of healthcare service providers
who may come to work in Belgium.
As to the proportionality of the contested measure, the ECJ
held that the referring court had to verify whether a system of
numerus clausus for non-resident students can really bring
about an increase in the number of graduates ready to ensure
the future availability of public health services within the French
Community. As to the necessity of the measure, the ECJ ruled
that it was for the referring court to ascertain whether there
were less restrictive means of encouraging students who study in
the French Community to establish themselves there. Finally,
the ECJ compelled the referring court to verify whether the
system of selection for non-resident students (based on chance
rather than on merits) was necessary to attain the objectives
pursued.
Three months after the ECJ delivered its ruling, the Belgian
Constitutional Court addressed six questions to the Government
of the French Community.'16 The purpose of those questions
was to obtain the relevant information with a view to
implementing the framework of analysis laid down in Bressol.
After obtaining a reply, the Belgian Constitutional Court
examined thoroughly each of the nine programmes referred to
in the 2006 decree,'o7 and found that only three of them
satisfied the requirements laid down by the ECJ, namely
Bachelor in physiotherapy and rehabilitation, Bachelor of
physiotherapy, and Bachelor in veterinary medicine. In relation
169. Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no 89/21011,
htp: / /www.const-cour.tbe (providing the judgment of the case in
French, Dutch, and German), 1[ B.6.
170. Id. [ B.7.
May 31, 2011,
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to the first two, it found that there was a real risk to the
protection of public health, as physiotherapy services currently
suffer from a significant shortage in the French Community,
which might even worsen with the increase in demand for those
services and with the incoming retirement of the baby-boomers.
Data were also provided showing that the number of new
graduates necessary to ensure a high quality of physiotherapy
services was of 323 per year." As to the suitability of the 2006
decree, the Belgian Constitutional Court found that, in light of
statistical data submitted, a reduction in the number of nonresident students had helped to increase the number of resident
students. 7 2 It also observed that between 61 and 70% of
nationals of a Member State other than Belgium who have
studied physiotherapy in the French Community do not
establish themselves in the latter Member State.l As to the
necessity of the 2006 decree, the Belgian Constitutional Court
examined whether the French Community could have adopted
a less restrictive measure, such as giving incentives to nonresident students to stay in Belgium, or encouraging
physiotherapists having studied abroad to come to that Member
State whilst limiting the number of physiotherapy students. As to
the first alternative measure, the Belgian Constitutional Court
found that it was not financially viable, since Belgium would
suffer from a double burden, namely paying for the studies of
non-resident students and for their initial stay in Belgium. As to
the second alternative, it ruled that such a radical solution might
run the risk of diminishing the quality of healthcare services in
the French Community. 174 Finally, owing to the fact that the
organization of entry exams for non-residents would impose
administrative and financial burdens on the Universities of the
171. Jd. 11.8.3.
172. Id. 1[ B.8.4.2. For example, prior to the adoption of the 2006 decree. there
were 880 non-resident students, whilst the number of resident students was 334. By
contrast, in the academic year 2008-2009, the situation was reversed: the number of
non-resident students was 366, whilst that of resident students was 734. The Belgian
Constitutional Court also noted that the number of applications lodged by nonresident students had not stopped increasing: in the academic year 2006-2007, the
number of non-resident applicants was 457, whilst in the academic year 2010-2011 it
was 611.
173. Cour Constitutionncile [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no 89/21011,
May 31, 2011, 1[ B.8.5.
174. Id. 11.8.8.2.
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French Community, the Belgian Constitutional Court
considered that the system of selection for non-resident students
by the drawing of lots was the less controversial. It also
1 75
guaranteed social equality between the applicants. As to the
programme on veterinary medicine, the Belgian Constitutional
Court reached the same conclusion. The only difference was
that the risk to the protection of public health did not come
from a possible shortage in veterinary services but from the
influx of non-resident students which could jeopardize the
quality of the education veterinary students receive.17 6 In
relation to the other six, the French Community had failed to
provide sufficient evidence in support of the 2006 decree.
Hence, in relation to the latter courses, the 2006 decree was
annulled. 17
B. The Persuasiveness of the EC's Legal Reasoning
It is often argued that the legal reasoning of the ECJ is not
elaborated enough; that it is closer to a mathematical formula
than to a clear and well articulated statement of reasons; and
that, more often than not, some parts of its argumentative
discourse are missing, have been skipped or jumped through.
For example, Weiler has urged the ECJ to abandon its
"Cartesian discourse", in favor of a more Anglo-Saxon-oriented
deliberation.'7 " He posits that, "especially in its [clonstitutional
jurisprudence, it is crucial that the [ECJ] demonstrate[s] [...]
that national sensibilities were fully taken into account. And it
must amply explain and reason its decisions if they are to be not
only authoritarian but also authoritative."1 79' Most importantly,
Weiler stresses that "the Cartesian style, with its pretence of
logical legal reasoning and inevitability of results, is not
conducive to a good conversation with national courts."180
There is undeniably great merit in those observations, but
they fail to grasp the fact that the ECJ operates under the
175 Id. I B.8.8.4.
176 Id. I B.9.2.1.
177 Id.
1B.1 1.2-3.
178. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: The Judicial Apris Nice, in THE EUROPEAN
COURT OFJIUSTICL 215, 225 (Grainnc de Brca et al., ds., 2001).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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principle of collegiality. In light of the latter principle, reaching
an outcome based on consensus is of paramount importance for
the daily inner-workings of the ECJ. Writing extrajudicially,
Schiemann stated that "[c]ompromise is the name of the
game."' 8 ' Accordingly, for the sake of consensus, in hard cases
the discourse of the ECJ cannot be as profuse as it would be if
dissenting opinions were allowed. As Schiemann observes, "the
best committee judgments tend by their very nature to be less
crisp and coherent than the best individual judgments."18 2 As
consensus-building requires to bring on board as many opinions
as possible, the argumentative discourse of the ECJ is limited to
the very essential. In order to preserve consensus, the ECJ does
not take "long jumps" when expounding the rationale
underpinning the solution given to novel questions of
constitutional importance. On the contrary, the persuasiveness
of its argumentative discourse is built up progressively, i.e.
"stone-by-stone." This means that, in order to fully apprehend
the approach of the ECJ in an area of EU law, a critical observer
should not limit him- or herself to studying the
"groundbreaking" case, but he or she should also read the
relevant case-law predating as well as postdating that case. This
idea is illustrated by the recent developments in the case-law
relating to the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship.
Ruiz Zambrano is a landmark case in the law on EU
citizenship.183 In that case, the ECJ ruled that, even in the
absence of a cross-border element, "Article 20 TFEU precludes
national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of
the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the
rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the
Union."1 8 4 In so doing, the ECJ was sending a clear message: the
Treaty provisions on EU citizenship are not limited to being a

181. Schiemann, Reflections, supra note 3, at 7.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Ruiz Zanbrano v. Office National de l'Emploi (ONEn), Case C-34/09,
[2011] E.C.R. 1-1177. See Koen Lenaerts, 'Civis Europaeus Sam': From the Cross-border Link
to the Status of Citizen of the Union, in CONSTITUTIONALISING THE EU JUDICIAL SYSTEM
EssAYs IN HONOUR OF PERNILLA LINDH 201 (Pascal Cardonnel et al. cds., 2012); see also
Koen Lenaerts, The Concept of EU Citizenship in the Case Law of the European Court of
Justice, 14 ERA FORUM (2013), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s12027-013-0279-y.
184. Ruiz Zambrano, [2011] E.C.R. 1-1177, [ 42.
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"fifth freedom" which operates under the dynamics of free
movement law. The rights attaching to the status of citizen of
the Union may be relied upon, even in the absence of a crossborder element, against any national measure causing the
deprivation of those rights.
For the case at hand, this meant that Mr. Ruiz Zambranoa Colombian national staying illegally in Belgium-had, as the
father of two Belgian minors, a derivative right to reside and to
work in Belgium, in spite of the fact that his children had never
left that Member State. The ECJ reasoned that if Mr. Ruiz
Zambrano were to leave the territory of the Union because of
his irregular immigration status (or because a work permit was
not issued to him), his children would be obliged to do the
same. As a result, "those citizens of the Union would [ ... ] be
unable to exercise the substance of the rights conferred on
them by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union."''8
Interestingly, in contrast to the extensive Opinion of AG
Sharpston,1 s the ECJ's legal reasoning is contained in ten
paragraphs 87 out of which only six concerned Article 20
TFEU. 188 Explaining such an important development in only six
paragraphs may, for some, show that the argumentative
discourse of the ECJ is laconic, cryptic, and even minimalist.
However, the ruling of the ECJ in Ruiz Zambrano did not come
"out of the blue", but it draws on the previous ruling of the ECJ
in Rottmann. As a matter of fact, in the key passage of Ruiz
Zambrano, i.e. paragraph 42, the ECJ itself refers to Rottmann.

185. Id. [44.
186. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. I1177. For example, it is worth noting that, unlike the Opinion of AG Sharpston, the
EQLdid not address the issue of reverse discrimination. Perhaps, once it held that the
situation of Mr. Ruiz Zarnbrano was not purely internal, the ECJ reasoned that it was no
longer necessary to determine the role played by reverse discrinination in the context
of EU citizenship.
187. Ruiz Zambrano, [2011] E.C.R. 1-1177, 1[ 36-45.
188. The other four concern the reformulation of the questions referred by the

Belgian court, the observations of the parties, and an explanation as to wvhy the CR1)
does not apply to the situation of Mr. Ruiz Zarnbrano. Ruiz Zambrano, [2011] E.C.R. I1177. 1[1[ 36-39: Parliament and Council Directive on Citizens' Free Movemnent and
Residence Rights, supra note 33.
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1. The Founding Stone
Rottmann thus set the founding stone that paved the way
towards the emancipation of EU citizenship from the limits
inherent in its free movement origins. The facts of the case are
as follows. Whilst being the subject of judicial investigations in
Austria, Dr. Rottmann, an Austrian national, moved to Germany
in 1995. Two years later, Austria issued an arrest warrant against
him. In February 1999, he acquired by naturalization the
German nationality, which meant losing simultaneously his
Austrian nationality. However, in August 1999, Austria informed
Germany of the arrest warrant issued against Dr. Rottmann.
Taking the view that by withholding that information Dr.
Rottmann had obtained the German nationality by deception,
Germany revoked that nationality and, since the original
nationality did not revive, Dr. Rottmann became stateless. Dr.
Rottmann challenged that decision before the German courts.
In essence, the referring court asked the ECJ whether, in a
situation such as that of Dr. Rottmann, it was contrary to Article
20 TFEU for a Member State to withdraw from a citizen of the
Union the nationality of that State acquired by naturalization
and obtained by deception inasmuch as that withdrawal
deprived the person concerned of the status of citizen of the
Union and of the benefit of the rights attaching thereto by
rendering him stateless, acquisition of that nationality having
caused that person to lose the nationality of his Member State of
origin. In the key passage of the judgment, the ECJ held that:
[i] t is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who,
like the applicant in the main proceedings, is faced with a
decision withdrawing his naturalisation, adopted by the
authorities of one Member State, and placing him, after he
has lost the nationality of another Member State that he
originally possessed, in a position capable of causing him to
lose the status conferred by Article [20 TFEU] and the

rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its
consequences, within the ambit of [EU] law.18m1
In reaching that conclusion, the ECJ stressed once again
that "citizenship of the Union is intended to be the fundamental
189. Rottnann v. Bayern, Case C-135/08, [2010] E.C.R. 1-1449, [ 42.
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status of nationals of the Member States." 190 With a view to
transforming this postulate into a living truth, the E(J places
weight on the status of citizen of the Union as such rather than
on free movement. In light of Rottmann, even in the absence of
any physical movement between Member States, national
measures which deprive an individual of his or her status of
citizen of the Union and thereby of the rights attaching to that
status, fall within the scope of application of the Treaty
provisions on EU citizenship.
Accordingly, reading Ruiz Zambrano in the light of
Rottmann, one may conclude that the former is actually
endorsing and developing the approach followed in the latter:
even in the absence of a cross-border element, Article 20 TFEU
opposes a national measure which does not formally deprive an
individual of the rights attaching to his or her status as an EU
citizen but, in practical terms, produces the same effect.
2. The Three Unsolved Questions After Ruiz Zambrano
After Ruiz Zambrano, three important questions were left
open. First, the ECJ did not clarify how in the absence of a crossborder element Articles 20 and 21 TFEU interact. Second,
neither did it specify under which circumstances a national
measure may "have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union
of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights
conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union", 191 or
when does a national measure produce a "deprivation effect"? It
was thus left to future cases to decide whether the ECJ would opt
for a restrictive or a broad interpretation. On the one hand, in
accordance with a restrictive interpretation, a national measure
would only produce a "deprivation effect" when it brings about
de jure or de facto the loss of the rights attaching to the status of
citizen of the Union. In order to produce such an effect, the
190. Id.

1

43. In so doing, the ECj sought to stress the fact that EU citizenship is

more than a fifth freedom which protects the rights of free novenent of economically

inactive citizens. This can be seen by contrasting the Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in
this case with the ruling of the ECJ. Unlike the Advocate General, the ECJ
'disregard[cd Dr Rotomann's] earlier nove and look[ed] exclusively to the future
effects that withdrawal of German citizenship wvould have by rendering [Dr] Rottmann
stateless.' See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. 11177. 1 42.
191. RuizZambrano, [2011] E.C.R. 1177,142.
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national measure at issue would have to cause more than a mere
hindrance on-namely a serious inconvenience to-the rights
attaching to the status of citizen of the Union. On the other
hand, according to a broad interpretation, a measure producing
a "deprivation effect" would be tantamount to a measure which
is "liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of [rights
attaching to the status of citizen of the Union] guaranteed by
the Treaty."1 9 2 Last, but not least, the ECJ had also to clarify
whether fundamental rights, specially the right to respect for a
person's private and family life, had to be taken into account for
the purposes of determining the existence of a deprivation
effect.
Since those three questions were not addressed right away
but their resolution was postponed for future cases, did Ruiz
Zambrano adversely affect the internal legitimacy of the ECJ? In
my view, it did not. First, providing an answer to those three
questions was not necessary to solve the case at hand. The ruling
of the ECJ in Ruiz Zambrano gave sufficient guidance to the
referring court. It made crystal clear that Mr. Ruiz Zambrano
had a derivative right to reside with his children and to have
access to the employment market in Belgium. Second, under
the preliminary reference procedure laid down in Article 267
TFEU, the ECJ operates as the court of both first and last resort.
This means that the ECJ cannot benefit from the "percolation"
effect known in relation to the U.S. federal judiciary. There are
no ELU Circuit Courts of Appeals that could adopt diverging
approaches on an important question of EU law, after which the
ECJ would settle the matter by undertaking a comparative study
of the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. The
preliminary reference procedure does not operate in such a way,
as there are no EU lower courts that can be used as
"laboratories" until the discussion among these courts is mature
enough for the ECJ to decide. Hence, in cases such as Ruiz
Zambranowhere the ECJ is drawing the external contours of the
Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, it must be sure of the steps
taken, of the direction in which it goes, and of the consequences
of its decisions. In the procedural setting of preliminary
192. That expression is commonly used by the E(J in the context of the Treaty
provisions on free iovemLent. See, e.g., Klaus v. Land Baden-Wu renberg, Case C-

19/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1663, [ 32.
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references, judicial prudence counsels in favor of limiting the
argumentative discourse of the ECJ to the questions which are
really to be answered in order to solve the case at hand. A
concise ruling is then preferable to one that rests on
assumptions of an excessively general and abstract nature which
are likely to be subsequently reconsidered in view of concrete
questions raised by new cases. It would undoubtedly be more
damaging to the internal legitimacy of the ECJ to send "mixed
signals" than to design an argumentative discourse that, though
not as extensive as some would like it to be, appears to be sound
and likely to gain momentum and strength as the case-law
develops.
3. The "Stone-by-Stone" Approach
As mentioned above, the fact that the argumentative
discourse in Ruiz Zambrano left important questions unanswered
is no less no more than a sign of judicial prudence. It is not that
the ECJ decided to avoid answering difficult, complex and
politically sensitive questions. On the contrary, it is simply that
those questions would only be addressed when the cases at hand
required it. This is actually what the ECJ did in AcCarthy and
subsequently in Dereci.19"
i. McCarthy: Drawing the Distinction Between the "Impeding
Effect" and the "Deprivation Effect"
Mrs. McCarthy, a dual Irish and UK national, was born and
had always lived in the UK, i.e. she had never exercised her right
of free movement. Mrs. McCarthy married a Jamaican national
who lacked leave to remain in the UK in accordance with that
Member State's immigration laws. In order to prevent his
deportation, Mrs. McCarthy and her husband applied to the
Secretary of State for a residence permit and residence
document under European Union law as, respectively, a Union
citizen and the spouse of a Union citizen. However, their
application was rejected on the ground that Mrs. McCarthy was
193. See McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Dpt., Case C-434/09, [2011]
E.C.R. I
(delivered May 5, 2011)
(not yet reported), and Dereci v.
Bundesininisteriun fur Inneres, Case C-256/11, [2011] E.C.R. I_ (delivered Nov. 15,
2011) (not yet reported).
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neither economically active nor self-sufficient, as she was a
recipient of State benefits. The referring court asked, in essence,
whether Article 21 TFEU applied to a situation such as that of
Mrs. McCarthy. To this effect, the ECJ held that:
no element of the situation of Mrs. McCarthy, as described
by the national court, indicates that the national measure at
issue in the main proceedings has the effect of deprivingher
of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights
[attaching to] her status as a Union citizen, or of impeding
the exercise of her right to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States, in accordance with

Article 21 TFEU.194
Indeed, the failure by UK authorities to take into account Mrs.
McCarthy's Irish nationality had in no way affected her right to
move and reside freely within the EU.
Next, the ECJ went on to distinguish the facts of the case at
hand from those in Ruiz Zambrano and Garcia Avello. In contrast
to Ruiz Zambrano, the ECJ observed that the national measure at

issue in the main proceedings did not have the effect of obliging
Mrs. McCarthy to leave the territory of the Union.19 As to Garcia
Avello, the ECJ explained that what mattered in that case was not
whether the discrepancy in surnames was the result of the dual
nationality of the persons concerned, but the fact that that

discrepancy was liable to cause serious inconvenience for the
Union citizens concerned that constituted an obstacle to
freedom of movement that could be justified only if it was based
on objective considerations and was proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. 196 The ECJ thereby in effect ruled that
dual nationality is not in itself a sufficient connecting factor with
EU law.197
Accordingly, the ECJ decided that the situation of a person
such as Mrs. McCarthy had no factor linking it with any of the
situations governed by EU law and was thus confined in all
relevant respects within a single Member State."
194. AcCarthy. E.C.R. I
(delivered May 5, 2011) (emphasis added).
195. Id.
196. Id. (referring to Grunkin & Paul v. Standesant Niebull, Case C-353/06,
[2008] ECR 1-7639. 11 23-24 29).
197. Id.
198. Id. 11 55-56.
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After McCarthy, one may argue that a combined reading of
Articles 20 and 21 TFEU suggests that in order for a national
measure to fall within the scope of EU law, the latter must
produce either a "deprivation effect" or an "impeding effect."
The "impeding effect" refers to the traditional line of case-law
according to which the application of the Treaty provisions on
EU citizenship requires the existence of a cross-border link, not
however that the national measure in question causes the loss, in
practice, of the rights attaching to the status of citizen of the
Union. As Garcia Avello shows, it suffices that the national
measure at issue is liable to cause "serious inconveniences" to a
right attaching to the status of citizen of the Union. By contrast,
as Ruiz Zambrano made clear, the "deprivation effect" does not
depend on the existence of such a link, but focuses on the rights
attaching to the status of EU citizen. Or in other words, the
"deprivation effect" does not require a cross-border link but
requires the national measure to cause more than "serious
inconveniences." That effect requires a defacto loss of one of the
rights attaching to the status of citizen of the Union.
It follows from the foregoing that the "impeding" and
"deprivation" effect are subject to different requirements which
are not, however, mutually exclusive: it is still possible for a
national measure which applies in a cross-border context to
cause the loss of the rights attaching to the status of EU citizen,
thus producing both types of effect. Hence, the ECJ opted for a
restrictive interpretation when defining a national measure
capable of producing a "deprivation effect."
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the ECJ did not
expressly refer to Zhu and Chen. However, that silence should
not be interpreted as a sign of inconsistency. On the contrary, a
close reading of Zhu and Chen reveals that the latter judgment is
entirely consistent with McCarthy. The application of the
national measure in question in Zhu and Chen would have
caused a "deprivation effect": just like the children of Mr. Ruiz
Zambrano, the deportation of Mrs. Chen would have forced her
infant child, Catherine Zhu, to leave the territory of the Union.
The deportation of her mother would indeed have had "the
effect of depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the
substance of the rights attaching to her status as a Union
citizen." Hence, her Irish nationality provided a sufficient
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connecting factor with EU law, not because she was an Irish
national living in the UK, but owing to the fact that her Irish
nationality allowed her to benefit from the rights attaching to
her status as an EU citizen. Accordingly, since the national
measure at issue caused the de ficto loss of a right attaching to
her status as an EU citizen, namely her right to move, that
measure fell within the scope of Article 21 TFEU.'"
Moreover, it is true that in Ruiz Zambrano, instead of having
recourse to Article 21 TFEU, the ECJ grounded the "deprivation
effect" in Article 20 TFEU. However, given that Article 21 TFEU
limits itself to giving expression to a right already laid down in
Article 20 (2) (a) TFEU, one may argue that Article 21 TFEU also
opposes a national measure which has "the effect of depriving a
Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of [the
right to move]."2oo
ii. Dereci: the Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights
In Ruiz Zambrano, the referring court asked, as a third
question, whether fundamental rights, in particular Aiticles 21,
24 and 34 of the Charter, had to be taken into account for the
purposes of determining the compatibility of the national
measure in question with the Treaty provisions on EU
citizenship. However, since Article 20 TFEU by itself opposed
that national measure, there was no need for the ECJ to answer
the delicate question concerning fundamental rights. In
AfcCarthy, the ECJ implicitly did not take fundamental rights
into account for the purposes of determining the existence or
absence of a "deprivation effect", as the deportation of Mr.
McCarthy would adversely affect the private and family life of his
wife. But this was not conclusive, since the ECJ clearly found that
"no element of the situation of Mrs. McCarthy, as described by
the national court, indicates that the national measure at issue
in the main proceedings has [either a deprivation or an
199. Parliament and Council Directive on Citizens' Free Movement and
Residence Rights, supra note 33, art. 3(1), at 38 (finding that today, an EU citizen in
the same situation as that of Catherine Zhu would fall within the scope of Article 3(1)
of Directive 2004/38, as that person, unlike Ms. McCarthy, would only have the Irish
nationality. Hence, he or she would be an Irish national challenging an administrative
decision adop[ed by UK atlhoritics).

200. Ruiz Zambrano, [20111 E.C.R. I-1177, [ 42.
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impeding effect]." 1 By contrast, in Dereci, the ECJ considered
that the time was right to address that question directly.
The facts of that case are as follows. Just as Mr. Ruiz
Zambrano, Mr. Dereci is a third-country national (of Turkish
nationality) residing illegally in a Member State of which his
children are nationals, namely Austria. o Just as the children of
Mr. Ruiz Zambrano, those of Mr. Dereci are still minors and
have never exercised their right to free movement.2 " After
recalling its main findings in Ruiz Zambrano, the ECJ clarified
what is to be understood by a national measure producing a
"deprivation effect." Such effect may only take place where "the
Union citizen has, in fact, to leave not only the territory of the
Member State of which he is a national but also the territory of
the Union as a whole." 0 4 Consequently, the impact that the
deportation of family members of an EU citizen who do not
have the nationality of a Member State may have on the family
life or on the economic well-being of that EU citizen "is not
sufficient in itself to support the view that [the EU] citizen
[concerned] will be forced to leave [the] territory [of the EU] if
such a right is not granted."2 * Put simply, fundamental rights
are not taken into account for the purposes of determining the
existence or absence of a "deprivation effect", i.e. they are not
relevant for the purposes of determining the scope of
application of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship in
situations such as those of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano, Ms. McCarthy, or
Mr. Dereci. Otherwise, the ECJ would be relying on
fundamental rights in order to expand the substantive scope of
application of EU law beyond the competences conferred on the
EU, contrary to Articles 6(1) TEU and 51(2) of the Charter.
Only after having established that the national measure in
question produces, in the factual circumstances of the case, a
"deprivation effect" may the restriction brought about by that
measure be examined in light of the Charter, in particular
Article 7 thereof. Conversely, if the national measure in question
does not produce such an effect, then that measure does not fall
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

McCarthy, [2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered May 5, 2011).
DeReci, 2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered Nov. 15, 2011), 1 24.
Id.
Id. 1 66.
Id. 1 68.
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within the substantive scope of application of EU law. This does
not mean, however, that the fundamental rights of the persons
concerned are deprived of any protection. As the ECJ clearly
stated, in such cases, it is for the national courts and, as the case
may be, for the ECtHR to judicially enforce Article 8 of the
ECHR.2on
iii. lida: Purely Hypothetical Impediments to Free Movement
In the aftermath of McCarthy and Dereci, some scholars
criticized the fact that the ECJ failed to take into account "the
impediments to prospective movements."o 7 They posited that
the ECJ itself appears to acknowledge in paragraph 49 of the
McCarthy judgment that the traditional line of case-law applied
to the situation of Mrs. McCarthy. Contrary to the views of the
ECJ, the deportation of Mr. McCarthy was liable to "deter" or
"dissuade" Mrs. McCarthy from exercising her right of free
2 08 that as the
movement. They argued, in light of Carpenter,
mother of three children and the primary carer of her disabled
son, Mrs. McCarthy would have no prospects of exercising her
right to move if her husband were deported.0 9 However, those
criticisms appear to be grounded in a set of facts which differ
from those described by the referring court.210) The factual
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Case Note on McCarthy and Dereci, 49 COMMON
MKT. L. RLV. 349, 366, 377 (2012) (holding that the E(J failcd to cxamine "prospectivc
movement rights").
208. See Carpcnter v. Scc'y of Statc for the Home Dep't, Casc C-60/00, [2002]
E.C.R. I-6279; see alsoJiav. Migrationsverkct, Casc C-1/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-1.
209. Shuibhne, supra note 207, at 370.
210. Consolidated Vcrsion of the Trcaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 267, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. C 326 [hcreinafter TFEU] (ascribing that it is
for the referring court to describe the factual scenario of the case at hand. In that
regard, the E(J has consistently held that Articlc 267 TFEU "is based on a clear
separation of functions betwcen the national courts and the [E(J], the latter is
empowered only to give rulings on the interpretation or the validity of [an EU]
provision on the basis of the facts which the national court puts bcforc it."); see
Ochischlager v. Hauptzollamt Emincrich, Case 104/77, [1978] E.C.R. 791, 1 4; see
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) v. Autonome Provinz Bozen, Case C-435/97, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-5613, 1 31 (depicting how logically, this means that factual lacunas arc not for
the ECJ to fill. Morcover, at the hearing, parties may, if thcy deem it necessary,
complete the factual scenario described by the referring court); see also Dimitry
Kochenov & Sir Richard Plendcr, EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient
Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text, 37 EUR. L. REV. 369, 389-90 (2012) (stating
the argument that the ECJ "closed its eyes to the essential elements of the McCarthy
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scenario of the case, as described by the ECJ and the Advocate
General, does not suggest that Mrs. McCarthy sought to exercise
her right to move. Thus, in my view, Carpenter is not the
appropriate comparator. Of course, had the referring court
stated that Mrs. McCarthy envisaged to work in (or to move to) a
different Member State and that Mr. McCarthy would be in
charge of taking care of the children in her absence, then the
ECJ would have undoubtedly followed the same rationale as that
endorsed in Caipenter. However, as mentioned above, the
prospects of Mrs. McCarthy exercising her right to move were
not mentioned at all by the referring court. Thus, in McCarthy,
there were no "prospective impediments to the right to move.
Those impediments were, if anything, purely hypothetical and as
such, fell outside the scope of the Treaty provisions on EU
citizenship. 1 1 This was made clear by the ECJ in Iida.212
In that case, Mr. lida, a third-country national residing
legally in Germany, sought to obtain a residence permit as the
spouse and father of two EU citizens. The purpose behind such
a request was to improve his immigration status as his residence
permit was to expire on 2 November 2012, subsequent extension
being discretionary. However, German authorities rejected his
application on the ground that his spouse and daughter, two
German nationals, no longer lived with him in Germany but had
moved to Austria. Before determining whether the Treaty
provisions on EU citizenship applied to a situation such as that
of Mr. lida, the ECJ examined whether Directive 2003/10921.
and the CRD were applicable to the case at hand.
family situation which were able to shed some light on what was actually going on.
Three children, one of them severely disabled and in need of constant care, went
unreported," are not accounting for a proper functioning of the preliminary reference
procedure. In addition, even assuming that in the factual setting of the case at hand, a
real issue of protecting the fundamental right to family life of the persons concerned
arises, this does not automatically turn that issue into a matter of EU law. This will only
be so if a substantive nexus to the latter laws is present, such as the "impeding effect" or
the "deprivation effect" of the national measure in question).
211. See Stanislas Adam & Peter Van Elsuwege, Citizenship Rights and the Federal
Balance Between the European Union and its Memrber States: Comment on Dereci, 37 EUR. L.
RLV. 176, 183 (2012).
(delivered 8 November 2012) (not
212. lida, Case C-40/11, [2012] E.C.R. I
yet reported).
213. Council Directive 2003/109/E(, Concerning the Status of Third-country
Nationals Who Are Long-term Residents, 2004 O.J. L 16/44 [hereinafter Long Term
Residents Directive].
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At the outset, the ECJ noted that Mr. lida was, in principle,
entitled to a residence permit as provided for by Directive
2003/109.214 However, since Mr. lida had voluntarily withdrawn
his application, a residence permit could not be granted on the
basis of that Directive.'1 As to the CRD, its provisions apply to
"beneficiaries" who are defined as "all [EU] citizens who move
to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are
a national, and to their family members as defined in Article
2(2) who accompany or join them."216 In this regard, the ECJ
examined whether Mr. lida could be regarded as a "family
member" for the purposes of Article 2(2) thereof. Regarding
direct relatives in the ascending line, the CR) limits the concept
of "family members" to those who are dependent on the EU
citizen concerned. For Mr. lida, this meant that he could not be
considered to be a family member of his daughter within the
meaning of that provision, as he did not depend on her.2" In
addition, whilst qualifying as a "family member" of his spouse,
Mr. lida could not be regarded as a "beneficiary" for the
purposes of the CR) owing to the fact that "Article 3(1)
[thereof] requires that the family member of the [EU] citizen
moving to or residing in a Member State other than that of
which [she] is a national should accompany or join [her]." 1
Stated simply, in order to benefit from the provisions of the
CRD, Mr. lida should have moved with his wife to Austria. Thus,
neither Directive 2003/109 nor the CRD was applicable to the
case at hand.
Regarding the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, the ECJ
went on to examine whether the refusal to grant Mr. lida a
residence permit could be liable to deny his spouse and
daughter "the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights

214. Id. (explaining how, first. the ECJ found that none of the cases mentioned in
Article 3(2) of Directive 2003/109 was applicable to the case at hand. Second, Mr. lida
was a third-country national who had resided legally and continuously in Germany for
five years prior to the submission of the relevant application. Third. because of his
employment, he was able to provide for himself and had sickness insurance in respect
of all risks normally covered in Germany. Lastly, he was not a threat to public policy or
public security); see also lida. [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered 8 Nov. 2012).
215. lida, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered 8 Nov. 2012).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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associated with their status of Union citizen or to impede the
exercise of their right to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States."219 The ECJ replied in the
negative. First, it observed that, unlike the situation of Mr. Ruiz
Zambrano, Mr. lida did not seek to obtain a residence permit in
the Member State where his spouse and daughter lived. Second,
the refusal of German authorities to grant a right of residence
under EU law to Mr. lida had not discouraged his spouse or
daughter from exercising their right of free movement, as the
fact that they had moved from Germany to Austria
demonstrates. Finally, the ECJ found that Mr. lida enjoyed a
right of residence in Germany which was, prima facie, renewable
and, in any event, he was entitled to a residence permit as a
long-term resident within the meaning of Directive 2003/109.
Most importantly, the ECJ recalled that purely hypothetical
prospects of exercising the right of free movement do not fall
within the scope of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship.
Accordingly, "[tihe same applies to purely hypothetical
prospects of that right being obstructed." 220
Furthermore, Jida confirmed the approach developed by
the ECJ in Dereci. The compatibility of the national legislation at
issue with fundamental rights could not be examined as a matter
of EU law, given that, as applied to Mr. lida, such legislation was
not intended to implement a provision of EU law. Indeed, as
mentioned above, neither the Treaty provisions on EU
citizenship nor Directive 2003/109 nor the CRD were applicable
to the case at hand.
iv. 0 & S: Exploring the Notion of Dependency
0 & S concerned two joined cases with a similar factual
background. The facts of the first case are as follows. In 2008,
Mr. 0, a national of Cate d'Ivoire, married Ms S, a national of
Ghana, who held a residence permit and was the mother of an
EU citizen of minor age from a previous marriage. In 2009,
Mr. 0 and Ms. S had a child of Ghanaian nationality in respect
of whom they enjoyed joint custody. Mr. 0 applied for a
residence permit in Finland on the basis of marriage. However,
219. Id. (referring to MlcCarthy, [2011] E.C.R. I
(delivered May 5, 2011).
220. lida, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered Nov. 8, 2012), 1 77.
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his application was denied by Finnish authorities on the ground
that he did not have sufficient means to provide for himself.
Mr. 0 and Ms. S challenged that decision before the Finnish
courts.
As to the second case, Mr. M and Ms. L, two Algerian
nationals, got married in 2006. Just like Ms. S, Ms. L held a
residence permit and was the mother of an EU citizen of minor
age from a previous marriage. In 2007, Mr. M and Ms. L had a
child of Algerian nationality in respect of whom they enjoyed
joint custody. Mr. M applied for asylum, but his application was
unsuccessful. As a result, he was returned to his country of
origin in 2006. Ms. L then applied for her spouse to be granted
a residence permit in Finland on the basis of marriage.
However, Finnish authorities rejected her application on the
ground that Mr. M did not have sufficient means to provide for
himself. She then challenged that decision before the Finnish
courts.
Accordingly, the referring court asked the ECJ "whether
the [Treaty] provisions

[

. . .

] on citizenship

[

. . .

] must be

interpreted as precluding a Member State from refusing to grant
a third-country national a residence permit on the basis of
family reunification where that national seeks to reside with his
spouse, who is also a third-country national and resides lawfully
in that Member State and is the mother of a child from a
previous marriage who is a Union citizen, and with the child of
their own marriage, who is also a third-country national."22 It
follows from the foregoing that the factual scenario in 0 & S
differs significantly from that in Ruiz Zambrano. Unlike Mr. Ruiz
Zambrano, neither Mr. 0 nor Mr. M was respectively the
biological father of the EU citizen concerned. Nor did they have
the custody of the child.
At the outset, the ECJ observed that the CRD was not
applicable to the case at hand, since the EU citizens concerned,
both of whom were minors, had never made use of their right of
free movement and had always resided in the Member State of
which they were nationals, namely Finland.2 22 Next, the ECJ

221. 0 & Maahanniuuttovirasto v. L Joined Cases C-356-57/11.
1

(delivered Dec. 6, 2012) (not yet reported).

222. Id.

[2012] E.C.R.
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went on to examine whether the Treaty provisions on EU
citizenship were applicable to the case at hand, i.e. whether the
national measure in question produced a "deprivation effect."
In this regard, after recalling its main findings in Ruiz Zambrano
and Dereci, the ECJ provided new guidance relating to the
concept of "dependency", which was implicitly taken into
account in those two judgments for the purposes of determining
the existence (or absence) of a "deprivation effect." To begin
with, the ECJ stated that the question whether a national
measure may produce such an effect must be examined by
reference to both the law and the facts of the case at hand.
Given that both Ms. S and Ms. L held permanent residence
permits in Finland, the ECJ noted that, "in law, there [was] no
obligation either for them or for the [EU] citizens dependent
on them to leave the territory of that Member State or of the
European Union as a whole."
Regarding the facts of the case,
"it is the relationship of dependency between the [EU] citizen
who is a minor and the third-country national who is refused a
right of residence", the ECJ wrote, "that is liable to jeopardize
the effectiveness of [EU] citizenship, since it is that dependency
that would lead to the [EU] citizen being obliged, in fact, to
leave not only the territory of the Member State of which he is a
national but also that of the European Union as a whole, as a
consequence of such a refusal."224 That dependency can be of a
2 5 In addition, the ECJ
legal, financial or emotional nature.2
rejected that the new approach set out in Ruiz Zambrano was
limited to situations in which there is a blood relationship
between the third-country national who seeks to obtain a
residence permit and the EU citizen concerned. b As to the
situation of Mr. 0 and Mr. M, the ECJ held, in light of the
information available to it and subject to verification by the
referring court, that there was no such dependency.2" 7
Accordingly, the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship did not
preclude Finland from refusing them a residence permit.

223. Id.
224. Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227.

id.
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However, the ECJ noted that Directive 2003/86 was, in
principle, applicable to the case at hand.2 28 As Ms. S and Ms. L
were two third-country nationals who held residence permits in
Finland, they could be recognized as "sponsors" within the
meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 2003/86 and apply for
family reunification. In this regard, the ECJ held that, subject to
compliance with the conditions laid down in Chapter IV of
Directive 2003/86-notably, Article 7(1) (c) thereof which
states that the sponsor is required to have stable and regular
resources which are sufficient to maintain himself and the
members of his family without recourse to social assistance-,
Finland had the "positive obligation" to authorize Mr. 0 and
Mr. M to join their spouses.29 Whilst in implementing Article 7
(1) (c) of Directive 2003/86 Member States enjoy a "margin of
appreciation", such a margin "must [ ... ] not be used by them
in a manner which would undermine the objective and the
effectiveness of that [D]irective."23 Nor may it be exercised "in
such a manner that its application would disregard the
fundamental rights set out in [the] provisions of the Charter,"231
notably Articles 7 and 24 (2) and (3) thereof. This meant, in
essence, that the Member States are required to strike a balance
between the interests of the children concerned and the
promotion of family life, and the margin of appreciation
enjoyed by national authorities. 3
0 & S is an interesting development in the case-law of the
ECJ which has two direct implications for the law on EU
citizenship. First, it provides further guidance as to what is to be
understood by a national measure producing a "deprivation
effect." Such a national measure must, either in law or in fict,
force the EU citizen concerned to leave the territory of the EU
as a whole. Second, unlike the national measure at issue in Iida,
in 0 & S the refusal to grant a residence permit to Mr. S and
Mr. M was covered by secondary EU legislation, namely by
Directive 2003/86. This meant that the compatibility of those

228. Council Directive 2003/86/E(

0.. L 251/12.

229. 0, [2012] E.C.R. I
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.

.

on the Right to Family Reunification. 2003
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measures with fundamental rights could be examined in light of
the Charter. Stated differently, a national measure which
neither falls within the scope of the CRD nor produces a
"deprivation effect" but implements other EU measures must
pass muster under the Charter.
4. Concluding Remarks
A joint reading of Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy,
Dereci, lida and 0 & S show that the legal reasoning of the ECJ is
far from being laconic or cryptic. The sequence of those cases
demonstrates that the new approach set out in Ruiz Zambrano
has been built up progressively, i.e. on a "stone-by-stone" basis.
Indeed, in light of Dereci, the new approach only operates under
exceptional circumstances, namely in so far as the contested
national measure forces EU citizens to leave the territory of the
Union, depriving them of "the genuine enjoyment of the

substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as
2B
citizens of the Union."*
If Ruiz Zambrano is examined in a vacuum, the discourse of
the ECJ in that case was arguably, as Weiler suggests, too
Cartesian. However, if those six cases are examined together, the
same does not hold true. On the contrary, the way in which the
ECJ built up its legal reasoning is rather similar to the way a U.S.
common-law court operates. As Schiemann notes, "[t]he ECJ
started by following the French tradition but has moved a
certain way in the English direction."234 Indeed, Rottmann, Ruiz
Zambrano,McCarthy, Dereci, Jida and 0 & S show that "the life of
the law [on EU citizenship] has not been logic: it has been
experience."2' At the outset, the ECJ decided not to answer all
the important questions to which the new approach set out in

Ruiz Zambrano would give rise. Instead, it preferred, for the sake
of consensus and as a token of judicial prudence, to answer
those questions as and when new cases arrived. The experience
gained through the deliberations in Rottmann shed light on how
to address the issues raised in Ruiz Zambrano, in the same way as

233. Ruiz Zambrano [2011] E.C.R. 1-1177, 1 42.
234. Schicimann, Reflections, supra no[e 3. at 4.
235. OLIVER W. HOiMFS, jr., COMMON LAW/ 3 (2009).
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the latter case did to address the issues raised in McCarthy, and
then in Dereci, Iida and O&Sand in cases to come. *
Moreover, the "stone-by-stone" approach followed by the
ECJ is not only the right way of building a solid edifice to the
rights attaching to the status of citizen of the Union, but it is also
entirely consistent with the dynamics of Article 267 TFEU. As
mentioned in the previous section, the internal legitimacy of the
ECJ requires the latter to honor the role played by national
courts during the preliminary reference procedure. The interjudicial dialogue that takes place under Article 267 TFEU is
deeply intertwined with the way in which the ECJ builds up its
argumentative discourse. Accordingly, if the ECJ were to follow a
model based on "expository justice" where it would provide
exhaustive, albeit abstract, answers based on logic to the points
of law raised by the questions referred, it would actually prevent
national courts from engaging in a constructive dialogue. HWhen
putting forward its legal discourse, the ECJ must strike the
appropriate balance between different levels of specificity and
generality in its reasoning. It must not be laconic and cryptic, or
too abstract, since this would deter national courts from making
a reference. In essence, the preliminary reference procedure
laid down in Article 267 TFEU being a mechanism of dialogue
between courts, the quality of the order for reference will largely
determine the drafting style of the answer given in the ECJ's
ruling. The latter must indeed constitute, first and foremost, a
real contribution to the solution of the case pending before the
referring court. Also for this reason, it is best for the ECJ in hard
cases of constitutional importance to follow an incremental
approach.
CONCLUSION
It is widely accepted that "hard cases make bad law", and
yet, in my view, cases which put courts at distress, such as those
examined in the present contribution, provide good evidence
from which one may determine whether the judiciary enjoys

236. See, e.g., Alopka & Others v. Ministre du Travail, de 'Einploi et de
lInniigration, Case C-86/12 (pending case) and Yincraga & Others v. Minister for
Labour, Employment and Immigration, Case C-87/12 (pending case).
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legitimacy. Indeed, it is in complex cases that courts often prove
what they are (and are not) capable of.
First, cases such as Iatsouras and Sturgeon demonstrate that,
when the validity of secondary EU law is called into question, the
ECJ strives to uphold the principle of separation of powers.
However, this task is not an easy one as that principle is subject
to internal tensions. On the one hand, the ECJ is prevented
from rewriting the contested act of secondary EU law. On the
other hand, the ECJ must try to avoid inter-institutional conflicts
which could arise if the contested act is annulled. Hence, as a
means of reconciling those two tensions, the ECJ has recourse to
"reconciliatory interpretation", according to which secondary
EU legislation must be interpreted in light of primary EU law in
so far as the limit of "contra legem" is not overstepped. However,
reconciliatory interpretation, as Test-Achats reveals, does not take
place where the challenged provision of an act of secondary EU
law is inconsistent with the objectives pursued by that act. In
such a case, in order to enhance the objectives pursued by the
EU legislator, the principle of separation of powers would
actually advise in favor of eliminating such inconsistencies.
Second, cases such as Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein show

that, where the core values of the Union are not in danger, the
ECJ favors "value diversity." If, in order to protect a
constitutional principle or a legitimate interest (such as public
health), a Member State lays down an obstacle to free movement
which establishes a higher level of protection than that of other
Member States, such a Member State is not acting contrary to
the principle of proportionality. However, in order to determine
that the Member State is truly pursuing that objective, the ECJ
will check whether the contested national measure and the
national legislation as a whole are free from contradictions. In
addition, as Mesopotamia Broadcast illustrates, when interpreting
EU harmonizing measures, the ECJ does take into consideration
national interests. It will strive to interpret EU harmonizing
measures in a way that accommodates the interests pursued at
both national and EU level.
Third, cases such as Bressol show that the ECJ is committed
to respecting the jurisdiction of national courts, in the same way
as the former expects the latter to respect its own. Since in
Bressol, the compatibility of the contested legislation depended
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on data that could only be provided at national level, the ECJ
decided to limit itself to laying down a framework of analysis
which the Belgian Constitutional Court had to apply. This
allocation of judicial functions demonstrates that the
preliminary reference procedure operates at its best when it
follows "comity": on the one hand, the Belgian Constitutional
Court decided to engage in a dialogue with the ECJ to discuss a
sensitive national matter, namely the means the French
Community had at its disposal to counter the adverse impact
that the exercise of free movement rights by students had on its
system of higher education. On the other hand, the reply given
by the ECJ must be interpreted as a sign of trust in the referring
court: it was ultimately for the latter, in applying the guidelines
laid down by the ECJ, to examine the compatibility of the
contested legislation with EU law.
Last, but not least, in hard cases of constitutional
importance, the legal reasoning of the ECJ follows a "stone-bystone" approach. This means that, in order to guarantee
consensus and as a token of judicial prudence, the
argumentative discourse of the ECJ is limited to answering the
legal questions that are necessary to solve the case at hand. As a
joint reading of Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy, Dereci, Jida
and O&S demonstrate, the incremental approach followed by
the ECJ guarantees a solid and sound evolution of the case-law
that allows room for the national courts to engage in a
constructive dialogue.
The role of the ECJ is that of a constitutional umpire
operating in a multilayered system of governance. "Saying what
the law is" often amounts to a risky venture, but one that cannot
be avoided if the ECJ is to secure its external and internal
legitimacy in pursuing the task conferred on it in Article 19
TEU.

